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THE HAMAS DEPORTATION: ISRAEL'S
RESPONSE TO TERRORISM DURING THE
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
Mark D. Allison*
INTRODUCTION
The Declaration of Principles' and the Gaza-Jericho self-rule accord'
between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization represent a
giant leap forward in the international efforts to peacefully resolve the
conflict over Israel's military administration of the occupied territories?
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Washington College of Law, The American University;
M.A., 1992, The American University; B.A., 1990, Claremont McKenna College. The
author thanks Mr. Justus R. Weiner, the Israel Colloquium, and the National Jewish
Coalition for their assistance.
1. See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept.
13, 1993, Isr.-P.L.O. [hereinafter Declaration of Principles] (stating that Israel and the
PLO agree to create a Palestinian interim self-government in the occupied territories
until a permanent settlement is reached pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338). The interim self-government will last for five years, in which time the
Israeli military will continue to maintain security control in order to ensure public
order and safety. Id. at arts. V, VIII; see also Ann Devroy and John M. Goshko,
Israel and PLO Sign Peace Pact, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1993. at Al (describing the
signing of the Declaration of Principles in Washington, D.C.); Ruth Marcus and
Thomas W. Lippman, Ritual End To Decades of Conflict, WASH. POST, Sept. 14,
1993, at A13 (detailing the highlights of the Declaration of Principles).
2. See John M. Goshko and Carlyle Murphy, After Last Minute Dispute, PLO
and Israel Sign Self-Rule Accord, WASH. POST, May 5, 1994, at Al, A40 (describing
the signing of the accord in Cairo requiring the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the
Gaza Strip and Jericho and the transfer of civilian authority to the Palestinians). The
self-rle accord finalizes the terms of the Declaration of Principles signed in Washing-
ton, D.C. in September 1993. Id.
3. See ESTHER COHEN, HUmiAN RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELt-OCCupED TRrmRIES
35 (1985) [hereinafter COHEN, HUMAN RIGHS] (discussing the areas that constitute
the occupied territories). The occupied territories are the areas captured by Israel in
its defense during the Six Day War of 1967. Id. The occupied territories include the
Gaza Strip, captured from Egypt, and the West Bank, captured from Jordan (known
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Before negotiations for these historic agreements began, however, the
Israeli Supreme Court4 (the Court) challenged the notion that the trans-
fer of authority in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to the Palestinians
could result either from terrorism' or international pressure. In a recent
in Israel as Judea and Samaria according to its biblical name). Id. Other territories
occupied by Israel include the Sinai Peninsula (which was captured from Egypt in the
Six Day War and returned in 1979 pursuant to the Camp David Accords), the Golan
Heights (captured from Syria during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 and later
annexed by Israel), and East Jerusalem (also annexed by Israel). Id. Israel continues
to administer the Gaza Strip and the West Bank until it is satisfied that a peaceful
settlement is arranged in the Middle East that guarantees secure and recognized
boundaries under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Yitzhak
Shamir, Israel's Role in a Changing Middle East, reprinted in THE ISRAEL-ARAB
READER 640 (Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin eds., 1984) [hereinafter Laqueur].
4. See Esther R. Cohen, Justice for Occupied Territory? The Israeli High Court
of Justice Paradigm, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471, 471 n.1 (1986) [hereinafter
Cohen, High Court of Justice] (discussing the various capacities of the Israeli Su-
preme Court). The Israeli Supreme Court serves two roles. Id. First, the Court pro-
vides for appellate review of civil and criminal appeals from the judgments of district
courts. Id. Second, the Court sits as the High Court of Justice and reviews the deci-
sions of public officials. Id.
It is not clear following the signing of the Gaza-Jericho self-rule accord
whether the High Court of Justice maintains jurisdiction over the occupied territories.
See Goshko and Murphy, supra note 2, at A40 (noting that the Palestinians will pro-
vide internal security for the territories, while Israel will provide security against ex-
ternal threats and maintain responsibility for the security of all Israelis and Israeli
settlements). Since both parties to the self-rule accord are required to take necessary
steps to prevent terrorist activity, including taking legal action, Israeli security orders
and actions affecting the territories will likely continue to fall within the appellate
jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice. See Declaration of Principles, supra note 1,
art. VIII (describing the public order and safety jurisdiction of the Israeli military and
the Palestinian police force); Goshko and Murphy, supra note 2, at A40 (outlining the
responsibilities and authority of Israel and the Palestinians in the territories). Israel
and the PLO have yet to resolve the size of the Jericho region which will determine
the area of exclusive Palestinian authority. Goshko and Murphy, supra note 2, at
A40.
Since the signing of the self-rule accord, Israel has completed the deportation
of four former PLO leaders from the Gaza Strip, but no appeals to the High Court
of Justice have yet occurred. Israel Expels Four Former PLO Officers, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS, July 14, 1994, at 44A [hereinafter PLO Expulsion].
5. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1990 (1991). The
State Department defines international terrorism for statistical purposes in the follow-
ing manner: "[t]he term international terrorism means terrorism involving citizens or
territory of more than one country. The term terrorist group means any group practic-
ing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism." Id. at v.
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case,6 closely observed by the international community, the Israeli Su-
preme Court affirmed the broad powers of Israel's military authority in
the occupied territories, and refused to provide refuge to terrorists at the
expense of national security and innocent lives! Furthermore, the Israeli
government has asserted that any resolution of the debate over the occu-
pied territories must result from negotiations pursuant to U.N. Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and not from the use of terror and
violence.
The occupied territories have long served to foment terrorism,' lead-
The League of Nations attempted to define international terrorism in its 1937
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. Justus R. Weiner, Terror-
ism: Israel's Legal Responses, 14 SYR. J. INT'L L. & Com. 183, 184 n.5 (1987)
[hereinafter Weiner, Terrorism]. The Convention defined terrorism as all "criminal acts
directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the
minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public." S.
QUREsHI, POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE SoUTH ASIAN SUBCONTINENT 152 (1976),
cited in Justus R. Weiner, Terrorism: Israel's Legal Responses, 14 SYR. J. INT'L L
& CoM. 183, 184 n.5 (1987).
6. Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 5793192,
Piskei Din _ (Decided Jan. 28, 1993) [English translation] (available from the
Embassy of Israel in Washington, D.C.).
7. See infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text (describing the Court's refusal
to restrain the military's broad powers under the facts of Association for Civil Rights
in Israel v. Minister of Defence).
8. See Declaration of Principles, supra note 1, art. I (stating that the parties
agree to create a permanent settlement with regard to the occupied territories based
on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338). The United Nations
Security Council passed Resolutions 242 and 338 following the Six Day War of 1967
and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, respectively. S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR. 22d
Sess., 1382d mtg., at 27 (1967); S.C. Res. 338. U.N. SCOR. 28th Sess., 1747th mtg.,
at 26 (1973). The resolutions called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the
occupied territories in exchange for a lasting peace with secure and recognized bound-
aries. ld. Before the Declaration was signed, the Israelis and Arabs disagreed about
the interpretation of these resolutions and whether Israeli withdrawal was precondi-
tioned on the Arabs signing peace agreements. See FRED J. KHOURI. THE ARAB-IS-
RAELI DILIMA 356-71 (discussing the negotiations for peace pursuant to Resolutions
242 and 338).
9. See Richard A. Falk and Bums H. Weston, The Relevance of International
Law to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the
Intifada, 32 HARv. INT'L LJ. 129, 129 (1991) (discussing the development of the
Intifada and the conflict in the occupied territories). Since December 1987, the Pales-
tinians residing in the occupied territories have engaged in an uprising known as the
Intifada. ld. Between December 9, 1987 and December 1, 1992, over 15.000 people
were killed or injured in the occupied territories as a result of the Intifada. including
Israeli Defense Forces personnel, Israeli civilians, and local Palestinians. INCiDiENTS IN
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ing the Israeli government to respond with various weapons.' One of
the least used" and most criticized"2 tactics involves the deportation of
suspected terrorists from the territories. The Israeli deportation policy, 3
depending upon immediate action for maximum effectiveness,'4 often
requires the government to suppress the right of appeal until after execu-
tion of the deportation order. In such cases the Israeli Supreme Court
attempts to balance the national security interests of the government
with the humanitarian rights of deportees under international law."
JUDEA, SAMARIA AND THE GAZA DisTRIcr SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE UPRISING
1, IDF SPOKESMAN'S UNIT, INFORMATION BRANCH (December 1992) [hereinafter INCI-
DENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES]. Despite the signing of the Declaration of
Principles in Washington, D.C., a formal ending of the Intifada has not yet occurred.
10. See, e.g., Weiner, Terrorism, supra note 5, at 188 (discussing the criminal-
ization of terrorist organizations through security measures under the Defence
(Emergency) Regulations); Cheryl V. Reicin, Preventive Detention, Curfews, Demoli-
tion of Houses, and Deportations: An Analysis of Measures Employed by Israel in the
Administered Territories, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 515 (1987) (discussing the use of
detentions, curfews, demolitions, and deportations by Israeli security forces in response
to the Intifida); Peter J. Morgan, Recent Israeli Security Measures Under the Fourth
Geneva Convention, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 485 (1988) (discussing the use of depor-
tations, detentions, curfews, and collective punishment in the administered territories);
Shalev Ginossar, Outlawing Terrorism, 13 ISR. L. REV. 150 (1978) (discussing alter-
native punishments for terrorist activity, including the death penalty).
11. See INCIDENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, supra note 9, at 9, 10 (show-
ing that since the beginning of the Intifada through December 1992, over 32,000
Palestinians were detained, over 600 Palestinian homes or buildings were either sealed
or demolished, and only 66 Palestinians were deported).
12. See, e.g., John L. Habib, Israeli Deportations of Palestinians Under Interna-
tional Law, 4 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 133 (1990) (criticizing Israel's deportation policy
as violative of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); Wendy Olson,
UN Security Council Resolutions Regarding Deportations From Israeli Administered
Territories: The Applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 611 (1988) (criticizing
Israel's deportation policy as violative of the Fourth Geneva Convention); Allison M.
Fahrenkopf, A Legal Analysis of Israel's Deportation of Palestinians From the Occu-
pied Territories, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 125 (1990) (criticizing Israel's deportation policy
as violative of customary international law and the applicable domestic law of the
occupied territories).
13. See OFFICE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, TEMPORARY EXCLUSION ORDERS--
LEGAL ASPECTS (undated) [hereinafter TEMPORARY EXCLUSION ORDERS--LEGAL
ASPECTS] (outlining the legal arguments in support of the deportation of terrorists).
14. See infra note 224 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the
appeals process which can take as long as one year).
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Balancing the interests of the government and the residents in the
occupied territories has proved difficult, given the geo-political complex-
ities of Israel's administration of the occupied territories. Israel remains
under the same state of emergency imposed at her birth in 1948,"6 and
has since fought five wars over claims to her land. 7 In the past, these
circumstances led the Court to grant great deference to the military and
the government for determining whether national security conditions
warranted deportations and the right to appeal deportation orders."
Only recently has the Court examined the government's deportation
orders more closely,19 scrutinizing both the evidences against the
15. See Baruch Bracha, Judicial Review of Security Powers in Israel: A New
Policy of the Courts, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 55-57 (1991) [hereinafter Bracha,
Judicial Review] (discussing the difficult process the courts have experienced in devel-
oping a balance between national security interests and individual liberties).
16. 2 ITON RIsHMI 6 (1948) [Official Gazette], cited in Amos Shapira, Judicial
Review Without A Constitution: The Israeli Paradox, 56 TEMIP. L.Q. 405, 443 n.132
(1983). The state of emergency was declared on May 21, 1948. Id. at 443.
17. See generally KHOURI, supra note 8 (describing the five Arab-Israeli wars
since Israel's birth which include The War of Independence. The Sinai War of 1956,
the Six Day War of 1967, the Yom Kippur War (also known as the October War) of
1973, and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982).
18. See Bracha, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 40 (noting the prior reluctance
of the Israeli Supreme Court to review security powers); Itzhak Zamir, Human Rights
and National Security, 23 ISR. L. REV. 375, 401-02 (1989) [hereinafter Zamir, Human
Rights] (discussing the special status of national security in the Court's review of
security powers).
19. See Cohen, High Court of Justice, supra note 4, at 499 (discussing the recent
trend of scrutinizing decisions by the Military Commander, and referring to the
Court's review of deportation orders implemented without the right to prior hearings).
20. See Bracha, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 68 (discussing the Court's
willingness to review intelligence information as evidence against a deportee through
an in camera examination). One of the difficulties for the Court in reviewing deci-
sions by security authorities is the use of privileged information gathered by intelli-
gence services. ld. To overcome this problem, the Court developed the use of in
camera review, through ex parte proceedings, which allows the Court to examine con-
fidentially the relevant information and inquire into the significance of the evidence to
the case. Itzhak Zamir, The Rule of Law and the Control of Terrorism, 8 TEL Aviv
U. STUD. L. 81, 89 (1988) [hereinafter Zamir, Rule of Law]. This inquiry into the
privileged evidence deters the government from abusing its powers because of the
potential of disclosure to the Court. kL; see also Shachshir v. Commander of the
I.D.F. Forces in the West Bank, 43(1) Piskei Din 529 (1989), summarized in 25 Isa.
L. REV. 130 (1991) (holding that where the government bases its deportation orders
on privileged information, the Court must consider the circumstances and facts relating
to the case in deciding whether to disclose the information); Matur v. Commander of
the I.D.F. Forces in the West Bank, 43(3) Piskei Din 542 (1989), summarized in 25
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deportees and the national security interests at risk." This new inter-
ventionist trend by the Court established a deportee's absolute right to
appeal a deportation order.' Nonetheless, in Association for Civil
Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence,' the Court broke from its pre-
vious interventionist approach and refused to restrain the government's
power to immediately expel suspected terrorists without first providing
hearings, and thus left the Military Commander with near complete
discretion as to the necessity of such procedural rights.' The Court's
decision reinforced the broad powers of security authority during nation-
al crises, and resolved any doubt about the Court's willingness to inter-
vene on behalf of terrorists when it balances national security interests
with humanitarian considerations under international law.'
In Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence, the
Court held that immediate deportation, without prior hearings, of 415
members of the Hamas terrorist organization following the brutal murder
of five persons in the Gaza Strip, was valid.26 Although the Court
found that the right to prior hearings was fundamental to natural jus-
tice, 7 the Court held that the Military Commander was empowered to
ISR. L. REv. 262 (1991) (holding that the Court may review privileged information
used in issuing deportation orders in the absence of the petitioner, whether or not the
petitioner agrees to such a form of review of the information); Alshueybi v. Military
Supervisor of the Judea and Samaria Region, H.C. 19/86, 40(l) Piskei Din 219
(1986), summarized in 17 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 307 (1987) (establishing a balancing
test, based on the risk to state security, for determining when information used in
issuing deportation orders is disclosable to the petitioner).
21. See Zamir, Human Rights, supra note 18, at 404 (discussing the Court's
landmark decision in the Elon Moreh case in 1979 which overturned the military's at-
tempt to confiscate land for military necessity).
22. See, e.g., Kawasme v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 320/80, 35(2) Piskei Din
113 (1980), summarized in 11 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 344 (1981) (holding that the
denial of a right to appeal a deportation order is grounds for annulment of the order);
see also infra notes 102-13 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's examina-
tion in Kawasme of the right to appeal a deportation order before its execution).
23. See infra notes 114-66 and accompanying text (discussing Association for
Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence).
24. See infra note 164 and accompanying text (stating that the Military Com-
mander has sole responsibility for determining the conditions that warrant an exception
to the right to prior hearings).
25. See infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the
judiciary and the Court in providing checks on the power of the Military Commander
to limit the right to prior hearings).
26. See infra notes 119-37 and accompanying text (discussing Hamas terrorist ac-
tivity and the military's response with deportation orders).
27.27. See infra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing the right to prior
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determine the conditions that warrant an exception to the right to prior
hearings.' The Court held that this departure from the right to prior
hearings was justified only in "concrete exceptional circumstances," but
the Court neither defined nor determined whether such circumstances
existed in this particular case.' The Court concluded that the Defence
(Emergency) Regulations empower the Military Commander with dis-
cretion to allow deportees to file appeals only after their deportation
orders are executed. 0
This Note examines the Court's decision in Association for Civil
Rights v. Minister of Defence, and considers other approaches available
to the Court for preserving an interventionist policy that permits the
Court to protect humanitarian rights without sacrificing national security
needs, focusing specifically on deportation proceedings.3 ' Part I discuss-
es Israel's use of deportation under international law, and the Israeli Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the
Hague Regulations. Part 11 describes the use of deportation under do-
mestic Israeli law through the Defence (Emergency) Regulations of
1945, and the development of the balance test that created the right to
appeal deportation orders. Part III evaluates the Court's holding and
rationale in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence
with respect to both the right to prior hearings and the exception to that
right, discussing how the Court's decision reflects a break from judicial
interventionism. Part IV examines two approaches to the right to prior
hearings in deportation proceedings that allow for an interventionist
review and preservation of the result of Association for Civil Rights in
Israel v. Minister of Defence. Part V concludes with two recommenda-
hearings as a fundamental concept of natural justice).
28. See infra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing the exclusive right of
the Military Commander to define the circumstances that permit an exception to the
right to prior hearings).
29. See infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's two
alternative approaches to resolving the case in favor of the government, including the
application of the exception of the right to prior hearings).
30. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's require-
ment that deportees receive an appeal to the advisory committee, and the international
agreement to permit 101 deportees to return to the occupied territories in exchange
for a halt in the United Nations' attempts to obtain sanctions against Israel).
31. This Note is limited to discussion of the right to prior hearings implicated by
decisions of the security authorities in the occupied territories. For an excellent review
of the right to be heard in non-security, administrative proceedings, see Baruch
Bracha, The Right to be Heard in Rule Making Proceedings in England and in Isra-
el: Judicial Policy Reconsidered, 10 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 613 (1987).
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dons to the Court for evaluating military orders in the occupied terri-
tories in light of the Declaration of Principles and the self-rule accord,
and the gradual transfer of civil authority to the Palestinians.
I. DEPORTATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
An examination of the right to appeal deportation orders in Israel
involves the threshold determination of whether there exists a right to
deport. Commentators disagree on the legal status of deportations under
international law.32 The two instruments for ascertaining the legality of
deportations are the Fourth Geneva Convention33 and the Hague Regu-
lations.'
A. THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949
Dispute over interpretation of the Fourth Geneva Convention centers
around both its applicability to the Israeli occupied territories" and the
intent of its drafters.36 The Convention states that it applies to the oc-
cupation of territories of any "High Contracting Party."37 Such parties
include signatories to the Convention that were the legitimate sovereigns
of territories now occupied by another state.3" While Israel ratified the
Fourth Geneva Convention,39 the Convention does not apply to Israel's
32. See supra note 12 (noting legal commentators who criticize Israel's right of
deportation under international law).
33. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention]. The Fourth Geneva Convention was created primarily to protect civilians
during military occupation. COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 27.
34. Annex to the International Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.I.A.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague
Regulations]. The Hague Regulations emphasize the military necessity of an occupying
force. COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 27.
35. See Morgan, supra note 10, at 485 (noting that disagreements exist over the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the occupied territories).
36. See id. at 493-94 (discussing the dispute over the proper interpretation of the
Fourth Geneva Convention with respect to deportations).
37. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 2(2).
38. Lorch, Symposium: Human Rights in Time of War, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS.
366, 366-67 (1971). Gerson asserts that discussion over the term "High Contracting
Party" is unnecessary because Israel is not an occupier of the West Bank, but merely
a trustee to the land in which the Palestinians are the legitimate sovereigns. Allan
Gerson, Trustee-Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel's Presence in the West Bank, 14
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 35, 39, 43 (1973).
39. See COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 44 n.51 (stating that Israel rat-
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administration of the territories.' ° The international community refused
to recognize the legitimacy of the Jordanian4' and Egyptian' occupa-
tions of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, respectively, prior to Israel's
occupation in 1967. Thus, no internationally recognized, legitimate au-
thority occupied the territories before Israel and therefore the Convention
is not applicable to Israel in its administration of the territories.
The government and military, however, apply the Convention on a de
facto basis for humanitarian purposes," and require that all military
personnel abide by the Convention when confronted by belligerent civil-ians in the occupied territories.' The Israeli Supreme Court holds that
the de facto approach is merely a political decision' that affects nei-
ther the Convention's legal inapplicability' to the occupied territories
nor its unenforceability in the courts.47 According to the Court, the
Convention only meets the requirements of conventional international
law, and thus is not available for consideration by Israeli courts.m '
ified the Fourth Geneva Convention on July 6, 1951, subject to recognition of the
Magen David emblem).
40. Id. at 45. Israeli application of the Fourth Geneva Convention would amount
to a retroactive recognition of legitimate Jordanian and Egyptian sovereignty over the
occupied territories. li Meron argues, however, that Israel is overly concerned with
the retroactivity argument, and that the Fourth Geneva Convention only applies to
persons, not territory. Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in the
Period of Transition, 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 106, 108-09 (1979).
41. Yehuda Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea
and Samaria, 3 IsR. L. REV. 279, 290 (1968). Only Great Britain and Pakistan rec-
ognized Jordan's annexation of the West Bank, and even the Arab League determined
that the annexation violated the Arab League Charter. lde
42. Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered
Territories, 1 IsR. Y.B. HUmi. RTs. 262, 263-64 (1971). Egypt never claimed sover-
eignty over the Gaza Strip. Lorch, supra note 38, at 367.
43. Meron, supra note 40, at 108.
44. General Staff of the I.D.F., Order No. 33.0133; Military Justice Code No.
1.33, The Authority of the Army in a Conquered Area. discussed in Esther Rosalind
Cohen, Justice for Occupied Territory? The Israeli High Court of Justice Paradigm,
24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471, 483 n.46 (1986).
45. Kawasme v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 698/80, 35(1) Piskei Din 617 (1980)
(known as Kawasme I1), summarized in 11 ISR. Y.B. HUm. RTs. 349, 351 (1981).
46. Id.; see also Sharngar, supra note 42, at 262 (stating that de facto observance
of the Fourth Geneva Convention does not mean it is applicable by force of law).
47. See Ayub v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 60678, 33(2) Piskei Din 113 (1979),
summarized in 9 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 337, 341 (1979) (known as the Beth El case)
(holding that the Fourth Geneva Convention only satisfies conventional international
law and thus can only be invoked by the state).
48. See Meron, supra note 40, at 11 (discussing the differences between custom-
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Both the government and the Court agree, irrespective of the issue of
applicability, that the Convention permits deportation for the purpose of
maintaining public order and safety during the occupation. 49 Although
Article 49 of the Convention prohibits deportations of protected persons
regardless of motive," the drafters' intent5' and the language of the
Convention suggest that a narrow reading of this article is necessary."
The official commentary to the Convention notes that Article 49,
written in the context of the Holocaust and World War II,3 is intended
only to prohibit deportations for the purpose of forced labor.' Other
commentators, however, assert that the article applies generally to situa-
tions where deportees are expelled to more dangerous locations for the
purpose of torture, extermination, or slave labor.55 For example, the
ary and conventional international law, the latter requiring Knesset adoption for con-
sideration by the domestic courts). Customary international law is binding on all coun-
tries, whether or not a signatory to the Convention which formalized it. Id. Conven-
tional international law, however, is binding on only the signatories to the Convention.
Id.
49. TEMPORARY EXCLUSION ORDERS--LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 13, sec. 2.
50. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 49, para. 1.
51. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS COMMENTARY, IV
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE To THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter Pictet, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY] (reporting on
the drafting of the Fourth Geneva Convention).
52. See Kenneth J. Bialkin, Interpreting Article 49, THE NAT'L L.J., Oct. 31,
1988, at 13, 16 (stating that a broad and literal interpretation of article 49 would lead
to perverse results).
53. Pictet, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 51, at 278-79. The Commentary
states:
There is doubtless no need to give an account here of the painful recollections
called forth by the "deportations" of the Second World War, for they are still
present in everyone's memory. It will suffice to mention that millions of human
beings were torn from their homes, separated from their families and deported
from their country, usually under inhuman conditions. These mass transfers took
place for the greatest possible variety of reasons, mainly as a consequence of
the formation of a forced labour service.
Id. at 278-79.
54. Bialkin, supra note 52, at 13, 14.
55. JULIUS STONE, No PEACE--NO LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST 39 (1969). In
discussing the limited reach of article 49, Stone asserts that:
[I]t seems reasonable to limit the sweeping literal words of Article 49 to situa-
tions at least remotely similar to those contemplated by the draftsman, namely
the Nazi War II practices of large-scale transfers of populations, whether by
mass transfer or transfer of many individuals, to more hostile or dangerous
environments, for torture, extermination or slave labor.
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language of Article 49, referring only to "protected" persons," and the
language of the Convention in Article 147, referring to "unlawful" de-
portations, indicate the need for a narrow interpretation of the prohibi-
tion against deportations. Preventing an occupier from implementing
deportations as a means of maintaining public order and safety in accor-
dance with Article 6458 would lead to dangerous results.O The Israeli
Supreme Court therefore permits deportations under the Convention
when security needs arise in the territories.'
B. THE HAGUE REGULATIONS OF 1907
Israel does not dispute the applicability of the Hague Regulations to
the administration of the occupied territories. 61 Unlike the Fourth Gene-
va Convention language which defines occupation in terms of the legiti-
macy of a prior sovereign,' Article 42 of the Regulations broadly de-
Id.
56. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 49, para. 1; see also Naser
Aziz Afu v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, H.C. 845/87, 27(88)
Piskei Din 785 (1988), summarized in 24 ISR. L. REV. 137, 144 (1990) (known as
the Affu judgment) (affirming the narrow interpretation of article 49 due to the use of
the term "protected person"). The Court stated that "the legislative object of a given
provision of a statute or a convention is of prime importance for determining its
scope." Naser Aziz Afu v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, H.C.
845/87, 27(88) Piskei Din 785 (1988), discussed in John L Habib, Israeli Deporta-
tions of Palestinians Under International Law, 4 EMORY INT'L L REv. 133. 142
(1990).
57. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 147; see also Bialkin, supra
note 52, at 17 (asserting that the term "unlawful deportation" indicates the validity of
lawful deportations).
58. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 64, para. 2. Article 64 allows
the military occupier to maintain orderly government in the territory and ensure secu-
rity of the military occupier as necessary to fulfill its obligations under the Conven-
tion. Id.
59. Naser Aziz Afu v. Commander of the Judea and Saxmaria Region. H.C.
845/87, 27(88) Piskei Din 785 (1988). summarized in 24 ISR. L REV. 137, 141
(1990). The Court in Naser Aziz Afu noted the absurd results if Article 49 provided
an absolute prohibition on deportations, especially for terrorists. Id. The result from
such a reading of Article 49 is that "[tihe physical presence in the [occupied] ter-
ritory creates immunity from deportation." Bialkin, supra note 52, at 16.
60. See Naser Aziz Afu v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region,
845/87, 27(88) Piskei Din 785 (1988), discussed in John L Habib, Israeli Deporta-
tions of Palestinians Under International Lmv, 4 FMORY INT'L L REV. 133, 142
(1990) (holding that Article 49 permits deportations for reasons of military necessity).
61. COHEN, HutMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 43.
62. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (discussing the binding re-
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fines an occupied territory as territory which is actually placed under the
control of a hostile force.63 In addition, Article 43 of the Regulations
provides that the occupier shall take all measures necessary to ensure
public order and safety.' Although the Regulations make no mention
of deportations,' the Israeli Supreme Court holds that deportations are
a legitimate exercise of the government's power under Article 43 to
maintain security in the occupied territories.'
A critical distinction between the applicability of the Hague Regula-
tions and the Fourth Geneva Convention to the occupied territories is
the former's standing as customary international law.67 The Israeli Su-
preme Court holds that the Regulations fall under the category of cus-
tomary international law, and thus are binding upon the government,
regardless of whether Israel is a signatory to the Regulations.' One
condition to the Court's adoption of the Regulations, however, is the re-
quirement that no conflicting domestic legislation exists, in which case
the domestic law would prevail. 9
quirements of signatories to the Fourth Geneva Convention).
63. Hague Regulations, supra note 34, art. 42.
64. Id. at art. 43. Article 43 states that "the [occupier] shall take all measures in
his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." Id.
65. See Pictet, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY, supra note 51, at 279 (noting that the
Hague Regulations do not discuss deportations because of the presumption that such
actions were no longer utilized in the international community).
66. Abu Awad v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, H.C. 97/79,
33(3) Piskei Din 309, summarized in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs., 343, 345 (1979). The
Court stated that Article 43 of the Hague Regulations permits deportations as part of
the military occupier's obligation to ensure public order in the occupied territories. Id.
67. Meron, supra note 40, at 111; see also Cohen, High Court of Justice, supra
note 4, at 484-86 (discussing the distinction between customary and conventional
international law, and noting that the Hague Regulations were declared customary
international law by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg in 1945). Cus-
tomary international law is determined by the consistent practice and the legal obliga-
tion of the international community. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES 102(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
68. Attorney General of Israel v. Sylvester, 15 Ann. Dig. (1948), cited in ESTHER
COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 35, 58 n.50 (1985);
see also Sheikh Suleiman Abu Hilu v. State of Israel, H.C. 302/72, 27(2) Piskei Din
169 (1972), summarized in 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 384, 386-87 (1975) (holding that
customary international law guides the propriety of administrative acts of security
authorities).
69. See Ayub v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 606n8, 33(2) Piskei Din 113 (1978),
summarized in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 337 (1979) (asserting the inviolability of Israeli
internal-municipal law when challenged by conventional international law).
1994] THE HAMAS DEPORTATION 409
H. DEPORTATIONS UNDER THE DEFENCE
(EMERGENCY) REGULATIONS OF 1945
Following the War of Independence in 1948 Israel formally ab-
sorbed all pre-existing laws through the Law and Administration Ordi-
nance.7' Among these laws were the Defence (Emergency) Regulations
of 1945,' promulgated by the British Mandatory powers that occupied
Palestine before Israel's independence 3 Ironically, these Regulations,
which conferred tremendous authority in the High Commissioner to
maintain public order and safety, 4 were primarily used by the British
to prevent Jewish immigration to Palestine."
70. Summary of the Report of the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine, reprinted
in THE Is AEL-ARAB READER 108 (Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin eds., 1984)
(stating that in May 1948, the British Mandate over the area known as Palestine end-
ed). As the Mandate was about to expire, the United Nations attempted to create a
partition plan to divide Palestine between the Jews and Arabs. U.N. General Assembly
Resolution on the Future Government of Palestine, reprinted in THE ISRAEL-ARAB
READER 113 (Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin eds., 1984). After the Arab residents
of Palestine rejected the U.N. plan, the Jewish residents declared the state of Israel.
STATE OF ISRAEL PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE, reprinted in THE ISRAEL-ARAB
READER 125 (Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin eds., 1984). The next day, troops
from five Arab states attacked the Jewish state, resulting in the War of Independence.
KHoURI, supra note 8, at 70.
71. Law and Administration Ordinance sec. 11, IToN RISI1 1 (Supp. A) (1948),
cited in Baruch Bracha, Judicial Review of Security Powers in Israel: A New Policy
of the Courts, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 56 n.81 (1991).
72. Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, PALESTN GAzarrE, Sept. 27, 1945,
(No. 1442, Supp. 2). See Baruch Bracha,. Restriction of Personal Freedom Without
Due Process of Law According to the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, 8 ISR.
Y.B. HUM. RTS. 296, 300 (1978) [hereinafter Bracha, Defence Regulations] (discussing
the historical development of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations and their applica-
tion by the Israeli security authorities). See also Bracha, Judicial Review, supra note
15, at 56 (noting the purpose of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations to promote
state security and protect fundamental freedoms).
73. Bracha, Defence Regulations, supra note 72, at 299. The Defence (Emergen-
cy) Regulations were originally promulgated by the British as emergency legislation
prior to World War H under Article 6 of the Palestine (Defence) Order in Council
1937. Il New regulations were published in 1945 which raise the issue in this Note.
Id.
74. Id Article 6(2) of the original 1937 Regulations stated that the "Defence
Regulations may ... amend any law, suspend the operation of any law, and apply
any law with or without modification." Id.; supra note 73.
75. See Bracha, Defence Regulations, supra note 72, at 299, 300 n.16 (stating
that the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 102-107C were primarily designed to pr-
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These Regulations, as adopted by Israel,76 are a potent means for
combatting terrorism by empowering the Military Commander" with
measures to restrict personal freedoms within the occupied territories.
The Military Commander may impose such security measures as police
supervision,78 detention,79 deportation,' demolition,8' or close off an
area within the territories.' These powers have the force of law," and
can override Knesset legislation."
A. AUTHORITY TO ISSuE DEPORTATION ORDERS
The Military Commander is granted the power to issue deportation
orders and to expel persons from the occupied territories under Regu-
lation 112.85 The Commander is required to evaluate military necessity
vent Jewish immigration to Palestine).
76. See COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 94 (discussing the dispute over
the applicability of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations). Israel's adoption of the
Defence (Emergency) Regulations, with respect to their application to the occupied
territories captured in 1967, was a source of controversy because of the prior occupa-
tions by Jordan and Egypt. Id. Local law in the occupied territories remains in force
except where its existence constitutes a threat to the occupier's ability to maintain
security. Id. Israel denies Jordanian claims that the Defence (Emergency) Regulations
were repealed by Jordanian law during its occupation following the War of Indepen-
dence. See Abu Awad v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, H.C. 97/79,
33(3) Piskei Din 309 (1979), summarized in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 343-45 (1979)
(holding that Jordan did not repeal the Defence (Emergency) Regulations during its
occupation of the West Bank, and thus the Regulations are still valid).
77. See Shapira, supra note 16, at 444 (explaining that the Military Commander
is a high ranking officer, appointed by the Chief of Staff with approval by the Minis-
ter of Defence).
78. Defence (Emergency) Regulations, supra note 72, Reg. 110.
79. Id. at Reg. 111.
80. Id. at Reg. 112.
81. Id. at Reg. 119.
82. Id. at Reg. 125.
83. Shapira, supra note 16, at 444.
84. Id.
85. Defence (Emergency) Regulations, supra note 72, Reg. 112. The first three
sections of Regulation 112 describe the powers of the High Commissioner (now the
Military Commander) to effect deportations:
(t)he High Commissioner shall have the power to make an order under his
hand (hereinafter in these Regulations referred to as "a Deportation order")
requiring any person to leave and remain out of Palestine.
Id. Reg. 112(1).
The High Commissioner shall have the power by order under his hand to re-
quire any person who is out of Palestine to remain out of Palestine. A person
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in determining whether to deport. Under Regulation 108,' the Com-
mander may issue the deportation order under Regulation 112 if he "is
of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient to make the order for
securing the public safety, the defence of the area, the maintenance of
public order or the suppression of mutiny, rebellion or riot."' The Is-
raeli Supreme Court affirmed the validity of this criteria when it up-
held the deportation of three senior members of a terrorist organiza-
tion. 9
B. APPEALING DEPORTATION ORDERS
Section 8 of Regulation 112 serves to limit the discretion of the Mili-
tary Commander. It requires the establishment of an advisory committee
to hear objections to the decisions of the Commandern' According to
internal instructions handed down by the Israeli Defence Forces,9 these
committees are chaired by a Supreme Court justice and must include
two members of the public.' After examining the evidence against a
with respect to whom such an order is published shall so long as the order is
in force remain out of Palestine. An order under this regulation may be made
subject to such terms and conditions as the High Commissioner may think fit.
IL Reg. 112(2).
A person with respect to whom a Deportation Order is made shall leave Pales-
tine in accordance with the order and shall thereafter so long as the order is in
force remain out of Palestine.
Id. Reg. 112(3).
86. Id. at Reg. 108.
87. IA
88. Nazal v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, H.C. 513/85, 39(3)
Piskei Din 645 (1985), summarized in 16 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 329, 330 (1986).
89. See it. (requiring the state to prove the evidence against the terrorists by
clear, convincing and unequivocal information).
90. Defence (Emergency) Regulations, supra note 72. Reg. 112(8). Section 8 was
not part of the original Regulations, but was created through the reforms of Regula-
tion 111 and its section 4. Bracha, Defence Regulations, supra note 72 at 306. Regu-
lation 111, relating to detentions, supra note 79, was repealed in 1979. Shapira, supra
note 16, at 448 n.152. For further discussion on detention reform, and the establish-
ment of advisory committees under Regulation 111, see Shapira, supra note 16, at
452-55 (discussing the movement for reform in detention law and procedures).
91. Bracha, Defence Regulations, supra note 72, at 306. The internal instructions
guide the decision-making of the Military Commanders, but are not published. Id. at
306-07. The general purpose and direction of the internal instructions can be learned
from the Instructions of the Attorney General with respect to Regulation 111. Id. at
306 n.41.
92. Id. at 308.
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deportee, the committee makes recommendations to the Military Com-
mander as to the deportee's final status," which the Commander must
accept without objection.'
C. ISRAELI SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Although international law does not require an occupier's courts to
review decisions of its own occupation forces,' in 1968 the Israeli At-
torney General granted the residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip
the right to appeal deportation orders to the Israeli Supreme Court.'
This new right was limited by the Court's deference to the government
and the militaryY In Alyubi v. Minister of Defence,98 the Court em-
ployed only a good faith test in reviewing acts pursuant to security
measures, and refused to examine the Military Commander's motive in
issuing orders under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations. The Court
93. Id.
94. See id. (stating that by virtue of the internal instructions of the IDF, supra
note 91, the decisions of the advisory committees are accepted as binding).
95. Cohen, High Court of Justice, supra note 4, at 474. Article 66 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention allows an occupying force to establish military tribunals and
courts of appeals in the occupied territories to judge offenses. Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, supra note 33, art. 66. The authority for the Supreme Court's review is based
on Section 7(b)(2) of the Israeli Courts Law of 1957. 9 Laws of the State of Israel
157-58, discussed in Esther Rosalind Cohen, Justice for Occupied Territory? The
Israeli High Court of Justice Paradigm, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471, 475
(1986).
96. Cohen, High Court of Justice, supra note 4, at 471-73. Although Supreme
Court review over military authorities in the occupied territories was unprecedented,
Attorney General Shamgar sought to protect human rights and compel the authorities
to seek legal advice before implementing security orders. Id. at 472-73.
97. See Bracha, Defence Regulations, supra note 72, at 309 (discussing the
Court's review of security orders as limited to a determination of whether the military
authorities exceeded their powers, and whether the orders were bona fide).
98. Alyubi v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 46/50, 4 Piskei Din 220, discussed in
Baruch Bracha, Restriction of Personal Freedom Without Due Process of Law Accord-
ing to the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, 8 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 296, 313
(1978).
99. Id. The Court in Alyubi stated:
The jurisdiction of this Court, in scrutinizing the competent authority's exercise
of its power emanating from the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, is
very limited. When the given Regulation empowers the competent authority to
act against an individual in any case in which it "thinks" or "it seems to it"
that there are conditions that require this, then that same Authority is the final
Arbiter in determining the existence of these conditions. In such situations, this
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held that the Regulations authorize the Military Commander to make the
final determination as to the military necessity of issuing security orders
based on the Commander's own subjective analysis."°
D. RIGHT TO APPEAL DEPORTATION ORDERS
BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION
The Defence (Emergency) Regulations do not specify whether the
right to appeal exists before implementation of the deportation or-
ders."1 In Kawasme v. Minister of Defence" the Court examined
this question in a manner consistent with its new interventionist trend.
In Kawasme, three mayors from Judea and Samaria were immediately
deported to Lebanon following the murder of six Jews returning home
from their synagogue."0 3 The mayors were not provided with the op-
portunity to appeal the deportation orders to the advisory committee
pursuant to Regulation 112(8),"°1 and their wives petitioned the Court
seeking annulment of the orders."03
Court's function is limited to examining whether the authority exceeded its
power under the law by virtue of which it was empowered to act, if the said
authority paid attention to the factors stated in the same law, and whether the
authority acted in good faith. Since it is restricted to this limited jurisdiction,
this Court is not to scrutinize the reasons encouraging the competent authority
to issue the given Order.
Id.
100. Id. The Court affirmed its holding in Alyubi when it later applied its decision
to deportation orders and refused to review the motivating factors of a military au-
thority. Haddad v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 17171, 25(1) Piskei Din 141, discussed
in Baruch Bracha, Restriction of Personal Freedom According to the Defence (Emer-
gency) Regulations, 1945, 8 ISR. Y.B. HUrt. RTS. 296, 315 (1978).
101. Cohen, High Court of Justice, supra note 4, at 496-97. The lack of specific
provisions in the Defence (Emergency) Regulations on the right to prior hearings has
not prevented the Court from issuing injunctions to slow the deportation process and
provide time for appeals. Id
102. Kawasme v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 320180, 35(2) Piskei Din 113 (1980),
summarized in 11 IsR. Y.B. Hmi. RTS. 344, 344 (1981).
103. Id.
104. Id. The Military Commander determined that prior hearings could jeopardize
"public safety, security of the area, and/or the maintenance of public order" under the
standards of Regulation 108. Id The mayors were leaders of the National Guidance
Council which was responsible for organizing strikes and demonstrations in the West
Bank. Cohen, High Court of Justice, supra note 4, at 501-02.
105. Kawasme v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 320/80, 35(2) Piskei Din 113 (1980).
summarized in 11 IsR. Y.B. HUrt. RTS. 344, 345 (1981). The three mayors were
deported to Lebanon and were not allowed to return to appeal their deportation or-
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In his majority opinion, Justice Landau determined that natural justice
granted all deportees the right to appeal their deportation orders before
their implementation."6 Landau rejected the military's argument that
the urgent security needs following the assassination of the Jews man-
dated immediate action." The Justice asserted instead that the govern-
ment and the military were obligated to abide by the law in all circum-
stances, even in times of emergency."
The Court refused, however, to declare the deportation orders null and
void." Rather, through the remedy of restitution in integrum, the
Court found that the deportees had the right to return to their respective
positions prior to the government's illegal act."' Thus, the Court
granted two of the three mayors the right to appeal their deportation or-
ders to the advisory committee."' For the third mayor, the Court re-
ders. Id. at 345.
106. Id. at 345.
107. Id. The Court stated that:
[E]ven if the respondents (the government) considered that, due to pressing
security grounds, it was very desirable for the deportation to be carried out
without any delay, this could not constitute a justification for their intentionally
ignoring the duty to observe the law, which is binding on every authority of
the State, including the Military Administration.
Id.
108. Id. at 346. Justice Landau asserted that:
the observance of the law is not a burden but a duty which must be performed
in all circumstances. This duty is imposed on everyone who exercised authority
in the State or on its behalf, not only in order to respect the right of every
citizen and individual resident, whatever his crimes may be, but also - and
perhaps mainly - in order to preserve the image of the State as a law-abiding
State, for the sake of all its citizens. We have always relied on the fact that in
our country the voice of law is never muted, even in times of hostilities about
us, and this Court, ever since its first steps, has insisted on scrupulous obser-
vance of the rule of law even in time of emergency.
Id.
109. Id. The Court reasoned that the failure of the state to provide prior hearings
does not implicate the need for an advisory committee review: only the deportee,
upon his objection, can bring the issue before the committee. Id. Thus, the lack of a
prior hearing is no different than a properly executed deportation order where the
deportee acquiesces, leaving the right of appeal open to the discretion of the deportee.
Id.
110. Id. at 346-47. The Court terms this retroactive remedy as restitutio in integ-
rum. Id. at 346. The appeal may be done by a written affidavit through an Israeli
consul abroad, or through the international Red Cross. Id. at 347.
Ill. Id.
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fused any remedy, concluding that the advisory committee would never
accept his appeal because of his call for the annihilation of Israel."'
While Justice Landau indicated that an exception to the right to prior
hearings existed during emergency conditions, he failed to delineate
which conditions justified such an exception and whether the expulsions
of the mayors indeed did amount to an exception in Kmvasme. Justice
Cahan, in his concurring opinion, argued that all three mayors were
legally deported as a result of an emergency exception, but again did
not indicate the terms for this exception."'
I1. ASSOCIATION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN
ISRAEL v. MINISTER OF DEFENCE
The conflict in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of
Defence"4 prompted international attention because of its implications
on the Middle East peace negotiations occurring in Washington,
D.C."5 Israel and her neighbors were discussing terms for a lasting
peace in the region when violent terrorist acts in the occupied territories
derailed talks."6 Consistent with Israel's hard-line policy on terrorism
and the preservation of security in Israel and the territories," 7 Israeli
military officials immediately expelled 415 members of the Hamas ter-
112. Id. The Court applied the el ard criteria which allows the Court to reject
judicial relief where an appellant opposes the existence of the state of Israel. Cohen.
High Court of Justice, supra note 4, at 502.
113. Kawasme v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 320/80, 35(2) Piskei Din 113 (1980),
summarized in 11 IsP. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 344, 347 (1981). Justice Cahan stated that the
right to prior hearings depends upon the circumstances of the case. Id. at 347.
114. Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 5793192,
_ Piskei Din - (Decided Jan. 28, 1993) [English translation] I (available from
the Embassy of Israel in Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter the Hamas Deportation Case].
115. See "We Will Fight For Peace Against Terror". NEAR E. REP., Jan. 4. 1993,
at 1 (noting the remarks of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to the Knesset on Dec. 21,
1992 discussing international criticism and attention focused on the Israeli decision to
deport the Hamnas terrorists, and the attempt to maintain Israel's commitment to the
peace process in light of the violent attacks).
116. See EMBASSY OF ISRAEL, FOR YOUR INFORMATION: THE TEMAPORARY
EXCLUSION OF HAMiAs OPERATIVES sec. 4 (undated) [hereinafter DEPORTATION
TALKING POIMs] (stating that the goal of the terrorist acts against Israel was to de-
stroy the Middle East peace negotiations).
117. Id. sec. 1.
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rorist organization who were responsible for leading the violent acts"'
and being held in Israeli detention centers.
A. HAMAS TERRORISM AND THE ISRAELI RESPONSE
According to the organization's charter,"9 the goal of the Islamic
fundamentalist Hamas is to exterminate all Jews and liberate Palestine
from Zionist control."' The means of accomplishing this goal, through
violent terrorist acts against targets in Israel and the occupied territo-
ries,' includes the killing of both military personnel and civilians, 22
without provocation." As a consequence, Hamas leaders seek to pre-
vent the Arabs from negotiating a peaceful settlement to the Middle East
conflict with Israel. 24
In a one-week period in December 1992, Hamas was responsible for
the murders of five people,"H including the brutal kidnapping and kill-
ing of a border policeman that shocked the nation.2 6 Hamas leaders
applauded the violent death of the policeman and promised more killings
in the future. 27
118. See id., Talking Points Sec. (describing the acts that prompted the deporta-
tions).
119. EMBASSY OF ISRAEL, BACKGROUND PAPER: THE COVENANT OF THE
"ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOvEMENT" (HAMAS) (1992) [hereinafter HAMAS COVENANT].
120. Id.
121. See DEPORTATION TALKING POINTS, supra note 116, Talking Point Sec. (de-
scribing the "liberation of all Palestine, from the (Mediterranean) Sea to the (Jordan)
River").
122. See INFORMATION BRANCH, IDF SPOKESMAN'S UNIT, THE HAMAS
BACKGROUND, THE ISLAMIC JIHAD BACKGROUND, THE UPRISING - DATA 1, 7-9,
(1992) [hereinafter HAMAS BACKGROUND] (describing recent terrorist attacks by the
Hamas organization which includes kidnappings and murders of IDF soldiers and
civilians); see also HAMAS COVENANT, supra note 119 (explaining that collaborators
with Israel and imperialistic nations will be cursed for their betrayal of Islam).
123. See Israelis React to the Toledano Murder, NEAR E. REP., Dec. 28, 1992, at
1 [hereinafter Toledano Murder] (citing Hamas Leaflet No. 65 stating that "[elvery
Jew is a settler and it is an obligation to kill him and take his property").
124. See HAMAs BACKGROUND, supra note 122, at 4 (discussing an interview with
Ahmed Yasin).
125. See Israel's Neighborhood, NEAR E. REP., Dec. 21, 1992, at I (detailing the
deaths and injuries as a result of Hamas attacks between December 7 and 15, 1992).
126. See Toledano Murder, supra note 123, at 1 (describing the brutality of the
killing and the widespread denunciations across the entire Israeli political spectrum).
In light of the brutal killings and the subsequent deportations of the Hamas terrorists,
a national poll in Israel found 91% approval for the actions of the Israeli government.
Id.
127. See HAMAS BACKGROUND, supra note 122, at 3 (stating that "it was not the
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Fearing that a security breach existed in the occupied territories and
more violence could follow," the Military Commanders in Judea and
Samaria and in the Gaza Strip issued temporary expulsion orders pursu-
ant to Defence (Emergency) Regulation 112.1" The deportation orders
called for a maximum two-year expulsion" of 415 members' of
Hamas who were held in Israeli detention centers. Through relatives and
attorneys, the deportees could appeal the deportation orders to the advi-
sory committees after the orders were implemented."
first act, as our people are well aware - and it will not be the last, with the help of
the Almighty").
128. See Hamas Deportation Case, H.C. 5793/92, - Piskei Din . at 23 (cit-
ing the Argument of the Minister of Defence, No. 31, stating that the presence of the
terrorists in the occupied territories would lead to further violence).
129. See id. at 8-10 (quoting the Order for Temporary Exclusion). The exclusion
orders were promulgated following votes by both the Ministerial Committee for Na-
tional Security Matters, i at 8, and the Israeli cabinet. Toledano Murder, supra note
123, at 1. The Israeli cabinet issued a statement following the vote in support of the
deportation which read: "In light of the emergency situation and in order to preserve
public order, the prime minister and defense minister is [sic] empowered to order
officers in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza to issue orders for temporary expulsions without
prior warning.' Herb Keinon, Court Issues 5-2 Ruling on Deporting Activists, THE
JERUsALEM POST, Dec. 18, 1992, at 1.
130. Hamas Deportation Case, H.C. 5792/93, _ Piskei Din . at 9. The Israe-
li government argues that the removal of the Hamas terrorists does not constitute a
deportation under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which speaks in terms
of permanent displacement, because the state only seeks to exclude them temporarily
for two years. TEMPORARY EXCLUSION ORDERS - LEGAL AspECrs, supra note 13.
This distinction is important for purposes of discussion of the proportionality of the
punishment, infra notes 215-31 and accompanying text, but it is not relevant to dis-
cussion of the right to prior hearings. See also Steve Rodan, The Legal Quandry:
Deport First, And Hear the Appeal Later?, THE JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 18, 1992, at
4 (quoting former attorney general Itzhak Zamir who believes that the "difference
between deportation and limited exile . . . is semantics").
131. Hamas Deportation Case, H.C. 5793/92, _ Piskei Din _. at 3 (quoting
the Argument of the Minister of Defence, No. 49). The state detailed the background
of the 415 deportees:
Involved are people, some of whom took part in the organisation and support
of acts of violence or in the guidance, incitement, or preaching of such acts.
The others assisted the activities of the said organisations in the sphere of eco-
nomic or organisational infrastructure, the mobilisation of personnel, the raising
and distribution of funds and also in the wording of proclamations and
organising the dissemination thereof.
Id. at 13.
132. Id at 9-10. The original exclusion order limited the right to appeal within 60
days of its implementation. Id at 10. This requirement was revoked by amendment.
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The deportation orders were executed on December 16, 1992, and
then temporarily stayed due to a petition to the High Court of Justice
challenging the validity of the orders.'33 The Court lifted the stay the
next day with an order nisi, 3 requiring the government to justify its
actions at a later date. The 415 deportees were then taken to an area
north of Israel, controlled by Lebanese forces.'35 The forces refused
entry of the deportees and left them stranded in an area known only as
a "no man's land."'3 6 Fourteen of the deportees were returned to the
id. at 12.
133. Id. at 12. See also Keinon, supra note 129, at I (discussing the Court's 5-2
decision to deport the Hamas terrorists and the legal maneuvering behind the imple-
mentation of the deportation orders).
134. Hamas Deportation Case, H.C. 5793/92, _ Piskei Din _, at 12. An order
nisi is a temporary decision by the Court that requires the government to respond
usually within 30 days to justify its actions. Cohen, High Court of Justice, supra note
4, at 480.
135. See DEPORTATION TALKING POINTS, supra note 116, sec. 3 (describing the
deportation procedure).
136. See Clyde Haberman, 400 Arabs Ousted by Israel Are Mired in Frozen Lim-
bo, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1992, at 1, 5 (describing the area where the deportees were
left as a "no man's land" between Lebanon and Israel); DEPORTATION TALKING
POINTS, supra note 116, sec. 3 (noting the attempt by the Lebanese forces to exploit
the deportations of the Hamas terrorists for political gain).
One of the preliminary issues that arose due to the deportation of the Hamas
terrorists was whether the Israeli military actually completed the deportation. See
Raine Marcus, Lawyers File for Return of Deportees, THE JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 20,
1992, at 2 (discussing the deportees' petition claiming that the deportation was not
completed because the Lebanese refused entry of the deportees into Lebanese territo-
ry). The deportees argued through their attorneys that Israel remained responsible for
the welfare of the deportees because they were effectively abandoned, and thus must
be returned until another state has decided to accept them. Id. The government disput-
ed the facts presented by the deportees and argued that the Lebanese army was in
complete control of the area where the deportees were camped. HIGH COURT OF
JUSTICE DECISION, EMBASSY OF ISRAEL (Dec. 23, 1992). The Court agreed with the
government and rejected the petition, stating that merely because the Lebanese army
has chosen to establish a roadblock which traps the deportees in a no man's land
does not detract from the Lebanese army's responsibility for the deportees. Id.
Following the Court's decision, the Israeli government refused to permit a Red
Cross convoy to pass through the security zone between Israel and Lebanon, citing
the Israeli Supreme Court decision on the responsibility of the Lebanese government
for the deportees. CABINET DECISION, EMBASSY OF ISRAEL (Dec. 25, 1992). The
government also condemned the actions of the Lebanese government that allowed the
media to interview and photograph the deportees for propaganda purposes, while at
the same time, refusing to provide food and water to them. Id.
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Israeli detention centers upon the government's finding that they were
mistakenly expelled.37
B. INTERNATIONAL REACTION
The United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 799" which
condemned the Israeli deportations, and charged that Israel's action
violated the Fourth Geneva Convention.' The Security Council assert-
ed that the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibited the deportation of
civilian populations,"4° and demanded that Israel both respect the sover-
eignty and integrity of Lebanon... and immediately return the Hamas
deportees to the occupied territories." The Arab states in the U.N. re-
quested further action by the Security Council, and consideration was
given to applying sanctions against Israel.'43 In anticipation of a deci-
137. Hamas Deportation Case, H.C. 5793/92, __ Piskei Din -, at 13.
138. S.C. Res. 799, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3151st mtg. (1992) [hereinafter Reso-
lution 799].
139. See David Bar-lMlan, The Deportations, COMMENTARY, Mar. 1993, at 43
(discussing the U.N.'s condemnation and double standard approach to Israel). The
Security Council never passed resolutions condemning other deportations of a much
greater magnitude or for less legitimate purposes than the Israeli actions. See id. (not-
ing the non-existence of any resolution expressing disapproval for the 300,000 Pales-
tinians expelled from Kuwait following the Persian Gulf War, the ethnic expulsions
from Bulgaria or the former Soviet Union, or the forced exile of millions from Afri-
ca). Michael Curtis notes that:
[i]t is symptomatic of the U.N.'s bias that it has found Israel not to be
'a peace-loving state,' when the ( Arab aggressors have made no efforts
to resolve the [Arab-Israeli] conflict peacefully or to accept Israel as a
state. Nor has the U.N. ever condemned the Arab aggressions against
Israel or the terrorist actions of the P.L.O. and other Arab groups.
Michael Curtis, International Law and the Territories, 32 HARV. INT'L LJ. 457, 464
(1991).
For a review of prior U.N. Security Council Resolutions condemning Israeli
deportations, see S.C. Res. 726, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3026th mtg. (1992); S.C.
Res. 694, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2989th mtg. (1991); S.C. Res. 681. U.N. SCOR.
45th Sess., 2970th mtg. (1990); S.C. Res. 641, U.N. SCOR. 44th Sess., 2883d mtg.
(1989); S.C. Res. 608, U.N. SCOR, 43d Sess., 2781st mtg. (1988).
140. Resolution 799, supra note 138.
141. Id.
142. ld.
143. Sanctions May Undermine Peace, NEAR E. REP., Jan. 18, 1993. at 1. The
United Nations has never levied sanctions against Israel since her birth. Id. The draft
resolution passed through the U.N. by the Palestine Liberation Organization called for
banning Israel from human rights meetings and banning foreign companies from doing
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sion by the High Court of Justice, the United States sought to broker a
compromise between Israel and the U.N., and refused to support any
sanctions.' "
C. THE COURT'S DECISION: DEFERENCE TO MILITARY
DISCRETION DURING NATIONAL EMERGENCIES
On January 28, 1993, the unanimous Court handed down its decision.
In writing for the Court, President Shamgar'45 found that the right to
prior hearings was fundamental to natural justice, 146 and that the tem-
porary exclusion orders of the Military Commanders were void as con-
business in the occupied territories. Clyde Haberman, Israel Rejects U.N. Chiefs Pro-
posals on Deportees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at A8. The Resolution was support-
ed by demands from U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali for Israel to repatriate the
Palestinians. Id.
144. See David Makovsky and Allison Kaplan, Security Council Will Delay Vote
On Sanctions, Clinton Tells Rabin, THE JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 24, 1993, at 1 (dis-
cussing the Clinton Administration's attempt to prevent a vote on sanctions against
Israel in hopes that a political or legal solution would resolve the situation). See also
Lisa Beyer, No Surrender, TIME, Feb. 8, 1993 at 51 (noting that the Clinton Admin-
istration hoped it would not have to face the dilemma of choosing between its loyalty
to Israel and its interests in developing diplomatic relations with the Arab states as a
result of the sanctions battle in the United Nations); Senators Urge Christopher to
Oppose UN Sanctions, NEAR E. REP., Feb. 8, 1993, at 27 (listing 72 U.S. Senators
who signed a letter dated January 29, 1993, addressed to Secretary of State Warren
Christopher, urging the Clinton Administration to veto any United Nations effort to
levy sanctions against Israel).
The United Nations Security Council eventually decided not to pursue sanctions
in an effort to focus on the Middle East peace talks in Washington that were on
hold during the deportation crisis. Clyde Haberman, Rabin Declares the Deportation
Crisis at an End, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1993, at 1, 7.
145. See Clyde Haberman, Israel's Highest Court Upholds the Deportation of Pal-
estinians, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1993, at Al, A9 [hereinafter Haberman, Court Up-
holds Deportation] (noting that President (the equivalent of Chief Justice in the Unit-
ed States) Shamgar ironically was once deported under the Defence (Emergency)
Regulations during the British Mandate - the same Regulations he evaluated in his
decision in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence).
146. See Hamas Deportation Case, H.C. 5793/92, - Piskei Din -. , at 17 (de-
scribing the development of the right to be heard in Israel). President Shamgar noted
that the Defence (Emergency) Regulations do not indicate whether the right to an
appeal should occur before or after the implementation of the deportation order. Id.
But the President pointed out that the British Mandatory Power that created the Regu-
lations did not provide a prior hearing for detentions under Regulation 111(4). Id. The
advisory committee that hears appeals for deportations under Regulation 112(8) was
the same that heard appeals for detentions. Id.
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trary to Defence (Emergency) Regulation 112.1 7 The Court, however,
refused to invalidate the deportations,' and applied the remedy of res-
titutio in integrum to return the petitioner deportees to their prior posi-
tion before the implementation of the orders.' 4' Although the Court
indicated that an exception to the right to prior hearings existed in "con-
crete exceptional circumstances," the Court failed to indicate whether
those circumstances existed in this case, or what the bounds were for
such an exception."
The Court relied heavily on its prior decision in Kawasme v. Minister
of Defence'51 to find that a right to prior hearings in deportation pro-
ceedings is: "not founded on statute, but on principles laid down by the
courts which oblige every authority to act fairly. The denial of the right
to apply to the [advisory] committee is similar to denying a person's
right to a fair hearing."" President Shamgar also referred to Jewish
law' and developments in constitutional and administrative law"5 as
foundation for the right to prior hearings.
The Court struggled to find precedent for exceptions to the right to
prior hearings. The Court instead noted its prior decisions on other
security measures, 55  the reasoning of legal commentators in
147. ld. at 29.
148. 1d
149. 1& at 30. The deportees were granted a right to appeal their deportation or-
ders on an individual basis to the advisory committees in a manner to be determined
by the government. I. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing the
concept of restitutio in integrum).
150. Id. at 29.
151. Kawasme v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 320/80, 35(3) Piskei Din 113 (1980),
sumiarized in 11 ISR. Y.B. HUlm. RTS. 344; see Hamas Deportation Case, H.C.
5793/92, - Piskei Din ._, at 18-21 (discussing the decision in Kawasme and its
implications on the right to prior hearings).
152. Hamas Deportation Case, H.C. 5793192, _ Piskei Din ., at 20.
153. Id. at 17-18, quoting The Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. The Com-
mander of the Southern Front, H.C. 4112/90. 44(4) Piskei Din 626, 637-38. The
Court referred to a passage from the Old Testament which states that a defendant
should receive a hearing prior to punishment no matter how clear his guilt. Hamas
Deportation Case, H.C. 5793/92. - Piskei Din ., at 18.
154. See Hamas Deportation Case, H.C. 5793/92, - Piskei Din _ at 17 (de-
scribing the trend in favor of prior hearings which exists both in constitutional and
administrative law).
155. Id. at 24. The Court referred to an exception to the right to prior hearings
for demolitions laid down in The Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. The Com-
mander of the Central Command, H.C. 358/88, 43(2) Piskei Din 529, and extended in
The Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Commander of the Southern Command.
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England'56 and the United States, 57 and the holding of an English
case.' Essentially, the Court chose not to make any decision on this
difficult question. The Court determined that if an exception existed
under Regulation 112(8), then the exclusion orders of the Military Com-
mander were unnecessary because the power to deport was already vest-
ed in the Commander and therefore no further legislative action was re-
quired.'59 If, however, no exception existed, then the exclusion orders
H.C. 4112/90, 44(4) Piskei Din 626. These decisions were not limited to demolitions,
and could apply to deportations. Infra notes 174-96 and accompanying text.
156. Hamas Deportation Case, H.C. 5793/92, _ Piskei Din _, at 26. The
Court mentioned the works of one British author who indicated the need for urgent
state action without prior hearings in times of public health and safety emergencies.
H.W.R. WADE, ADMwisTRATrVE LAW 451 (4th ed. 1977), cited in Association for
Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 5793/92, _ Piskei Din _ (De-
cided Jan. 28, 1993) [English translation] 1, 26.
157. Hamas Deportation Case, H.C. 5793/92, _ Piskei Din _, at 27. The
Court referred to the recognized exception to the right to prior hearings in the United
States in times of emergency, which is not limited to health or safety cases. B.
SCHWAR'iZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 210-11 (3d ed. 1976), cited in Association for Civ-
il Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 5793/92, - Piskei Din - (Decid-
ed Jan. 28, 1993) [English translation] 1, 27.
158. Hamas Deportation Case, H.C. 5793/92, _ Piskei Din _, at 26. The
Court discussed an English legal decision that upheld the deportation of an American
journalist without a prior hearing, and without any disclosure of the evidence against
the deportee. R. v. Secretary of State for Home Department, ex parte Honsenball
(1977) cited in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence, H.C.
5793/92, _ Piskei Din - (Decided Jan. 28, 1993) [English translation] 1, 26. The
Court noted that this English decision was handed down during a time of peace in
Great Britain, supporting the claim that a right to prior hearing could certainly be
excused during a time of emergency if national security interests required such an
action. Hamas Deportation Case, H.C. 5793/92, - Piskei Din -, at 26.
English cases have long served as guiding lights to the Israeli courts, in partic-
ular the critical decision in Liversidge v. Anderson. Liversidge v. Anderson, 3 All
E.R. 338 (1941), discussed in Baruch Bracha, Judicial Review of Security Powers in
Israel: A New Policy of the Courts, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 42-43 (1991). The
court in Liversidge held that the Secretary of State had the absolute discretion to
determine whether hostile elements existed which required detention, and the courts
would not intervene merely to determine reasonableness. Id. at 42 n.8. Despite the
acceptance of Liversidge among Israeli courts, the English courts often refuse to fol-
low it. Id. at 43 nn. 11-15.
159. Hamas Deportation Case, H.C. 5793/92, _ Piskei Din _, at 28. The
Court reasoned that the Temporary Exclusion Orders were in effect redundant use of
power, and that the Military Commanders could rely on their vested power from De-
fence (Emergency) Regulation 112. Id. at 29. Thus the Court concluded that the ex-
clusion orders "neither add nor subtract anything." Id. at 28.
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were invalid, and the government would have to reinstate the deportees
to their prior position before the implementation of the orders, as re-
quired by Kawasme."' Either way, the deportees were guaranteed a
right to appeal their deportation orders, and thus no conclusion on
whether an exception to prior hearings existed under the circumstances
in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence was
necessary. 6'
The Court, however, did find that insofar as the temporary exclusion
orders attempted to alter the "general established norms of administrative
law" by eliminating the right to prior hearings, the orders were inval-
id." The Court stated that: "[o]nly concrete exceptional circumstances
can create a different balance between the conflicting rights and values,
and such circumstances were not detailed in the wording of the Tempo-
rary Provisions."'" The Court made no effort to define these "concrete
exceptional circumstances." Instead, the Court found that the exclusive
power to define the concrete exceptional circumstances belongs to the
Military Commander:
mhe power to find that there is an exception in a specific concrete case,
in which the compulsion of reality obliges immediate action before grant-
ing the right of hearing, is in any event inherent in the authority to exer-
cise the power in respect whereof the right of hearing is sought."
As a result of the Court's decision, the deportees were granted the
right to appeal their deportation orders individually to the advisory com-
mittee.'" An agreement reached between Israel and the international
community, however, allowed one hundred-one of the deportees to re-
160. Id.
161. I.
162. I. at 29. The Court's analysis of this issue was unnecessary because it had
already determined that the deportees had a right to appeal the deportation orders one
way or another Id. at 28. But insofar as the Court struck down an attempt by the
Military Commanders to create general legislation that eliminates the right to prior
hearings, such a decision is meaningless given that the Court preserved the Military
Comnlander's power to determine the conditions of the exception to the right to prior
hearings. See infra note 164 and accompanying text (describing the Military
Commander's authority to find an exception to the right to prior hearings).
163. Hamas Deportation Case, H.C. 5793/92, - Piskei Din - at 29. The
Court not only failed to mention what concrete exceptional circumstances justified an
elimination of the right to prior hearings, but also failed to provide any guidance to
the Military Commanders. ld,
164. Id. at 28.
165. Id. at 30.
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turn to detention centers in the occupied territories in exchange for sus-
pension of efforts to impose sanctions on Israel."
IV. ANALYSIS: THE COURT'S NON-INTERVENTIONIST
DECISION AND THE PATH NOT TAKEN
The Court's decision in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Min-
ister of Defence leaves open the question of what the government's
burden of proof now is in justifying the implementation of deportation
orders without prior hearings. 67 The Court's failure to delineate
bounds to the exception for a right to prior hearings has created confu-
sion even among legal scholars." In addition, the impact of the
Court's decision on the military and its use of force in the occupied
territories remains uncertain."
Although the responsibility for checking the powers and authorities of
the military does not always belong to the judiciary,7' the court failed
166. See DECISION OF SPECIAL GOVERNMENT SESSION, EMBASSY OF ISRAEL (Feb.
1, 1993) (outlining the plan for returning 101 deportees according to the agreement
worked out between Israel and the United States). The Israeli government stated that
the decision to allow the return of the deportees was done for the sake of preserving
the Middle East peace process. RABIN PRESS CONFERENCE REGARDING TODAY'S
SPECIAL CABINET SESSION, EMBASSY OF ISRAEL (Feb. 1, 1993). The agreement,
which was worked out by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, did not effect the
return of the deportees immediately. Skillful Diplomacy, NEAR E. REP., Feb. 8, 1993,
at 1. The deportees chose to remain in southern Lebanon until all were taken back.
Id. But in mid-August 1993, the deportees announced their willingness to accept the
Christopher plan, due apparently to the news blackout of the deportees' plight and the
dying international outrage. Clyde Haberman, At Lebanon Border 395 Deportees Yield
to Israel on Return, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at Al, A3.
167. See Zeev Segal, Justices Speak Loudly on Right to be Heard, THE
JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 29, 1993, at 4 (stating that "[i]n the future, the government
must have a very strong case to choose a deportation option without allowing the
deportee to be heard in advance").
168. See id. (stating that while the Court "refrained from saying whether the cir-
cumstances justified immediate deportation in the current case," the Court decision
"eliminated any possibility" that the military could execute immediate deportation or-
ders without granting prior notice to deportees).
169. But see Baruch Bracha, Addendum: Some Remarks on Israeli Law Regarding
National Security, 10 ISR. Y.B. HuM. RTS. 289, 295-96 (1980) (finding that despite
the broad discretion granted by the courts to the military in exercising powers under
the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, the security forces have not abused their securi-
ty authority). Much of the security forces' discretion is limited by internal guidelines
handed down by the Executive Branch. Id. at 296.
170. See Zamir, Rule of Law, supra note 20, at 84 (asserting that the judiciary is
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to provide any guidance in its decision. Instead the Court left it to the
military authorities to determine the conditions for the right to prior
hearings, and any exceptions thereto.' The Court's decision also im-
plicitly rejected other approaches to resolving this case which would
have provided judicial limits to the discretion of the military authorities.
Thus, the Court's decision reflected a turn away from the interventionist
trend that had been building since the late 1970's." With its rejection
of these alternative paths, the Court sent a strong message to terrorists
that, irrespective of the peace process or international pressure, public
order and safety for military personnel and civilians will override the
procedural humanitarian rights of those participating in terrorist activi-
ty.17
3
Two alternative approaches existed for the Court to resolve the unan-
swered question about the bounds to an exception to prior hearings in
deportation proceedings. If adopted, these approaches would have per-
mitted the Court to maintain an interventionist role consistent with the
purposes for which jurisdiction over the occupied territories was granted,
and served to preserve the government security interests. Both approach-
es, if applied under the facts of Association for Civil Rights in Israel v.
Minister of Defence, would have warranted an outcome identical to that
reached by the Court.
First, the Court has created exceptions to prior hearings for other
security measures which could apply to deportation orders. Second, the
Court has examined military discretion according to three methods of
judicial review which offer the Court the opportunity to develop a con-
sistent approach to balancing the relevant interests and liberties in depor-
tation proceedings. The Court implicitly rejected both of these alterna-
tives however by not addressing them in their opinion.
only one of the branches responsible for limiting the discretion of security forces).
Former Attorney General Itzhak Zamir believes that the legislature also has a duty to
"define conditions, procedures, and controls, to the extent practical, so that security
powers are not abused." Id.
171. See Rodan, supra note 130. at 4 (quoting former Attorney General Itzhak
Zamir who commented before the Court's decision that "[t]he [l]ilitary (C]ommander
is like God, like a prime minister, a king").
172. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's inter-
ventionist policy during the 1970's).
173. See Haberman, Court Upholds Deportation, supra note 145, at Al. A9 (not-
ing that the decision jeopardizes the Middle East peace process).
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A. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RIGHT TO PRIOR
HEARINGS IN OTHER SECURITY MEASURES
The Court cited the case of Association for Civil Rights in Israel v.
Commander of the Central Front74 in support of its claim that valid
exceptions to the right to prior hearings exist in Israeli case law. 7"
That case involved the Military Commander's implementation of a de-
molition order to destroy homes under Defence (Emergency) Regulation
119 without prior notice.'76 The Military Commander argued that any
delay in action weakened the deterrent effect of the order.'" The Court
rejected this argument due to the "severe and irreversible character" of a
demolition,' but established an exception. Then-Justice (now President
of the Court) Shamgar stated the bounds to this exception:
Indeed, there are military and operational circumstances, in which judicial
review cannot be reconciled with the conditions of place and time or with
the nature of the circumstances; for instance, when a military unit is
carrying out an operation, in the course of which it has to remove an
obstacle or to overcome resistance or react on the spot to an attack on
military forces or on civilians which occurs at the same time, or in simi-
lar circumstances in which the competent military authority finds immedi-
ate action to be an operational necessity. By the very nature of the mat-
ter, there is no room, in such circumstances, to postpone the military
action which is required on the spot.'79
This exception is not limited to Defence (Emergency) Regulation 119,
and is applicable to other governmental security measures.' But due
174. Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Commander of the Central Front,
H.C. 358/88, 43(2) Piskei Din 529 (1989), discussed in Baruch Bracha, Judicial Re-
view of Security Powers in Israel: A New Policy of the Courts, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L.
39, 75-81 (1991). Note that in the translation from Hebrew to English, the words
"front" and "command" are often interchanged.
175. See supra note 155 (noting the Court's reference to Association for Civil
Rights in Israel v. Commander of the Central Front).
176. Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Commander of the Central Front,
H.C. 358/88, 43(2) Piskei Din 529 (1989), discussed in Baruch Bracha, Judicial Re-
view of Security Powers in Israel: A New Policy of the Courts, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L.
39, 75 (1991).
177. Id. at 76.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 76-77.
180. Bracha, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 77.
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to the narrow facts described by Shamgar, the courts must refrain from
applying the exception where the security measure is irreversible.'
The Court has previously erred in applying the Shamgar exception
laid out in Commander of the Central Front." Justice Elon, in writing
for the Court in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Commander of
the Southern Front," interpreted Justice Shamgar's exception as ap-
plying to any circumstances of immediate military necessity.' Justice
Shamgar however stated that the exception is only applicable in those
circumstances similar to the immediate necessity of removing obstacles
or overcoming resistance during military operations." As a result, the
Court mistakenly broadened Shamgar's exception to include national
security interests."
181. Ia at 77-78. The "severe and irreversible character" of a security measure
raises the issue of whether the "temporary" exclusion of the deportees in Association
for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence is relevant to the right to prior hear-
*ings. The Israeli government highlighted the importance of the term "temporary."
TEMPORARY EXCLUSION ORDERS-LEGAL AsPECTS, supra note 13, at 1. But the Court
in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence did not take any time
to discuss the relevance of the word "temporary" in the deportation order, most likely
because Defence (Emergency) Regulation 112 is explicit about the power of the Mili-
tary Commander to exclude any person from Israel for any length of time deemed
necessary. Defence (Emergency) Regulations, supra note 72, Reg. 112(2) and (3);
supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
182. See Bracha, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 79 (discussing the erroneous
interpretation of Justice Elon in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Commander
of the Southern Front).
183. Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Commander of the Southern Front,
H.C. 4112/90, 44(4) Piskei Din 626, discussed in Baruch Bracha, Judicial Review of
Security Powers in Israel: A New Policy of the Courts, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L 39, 78-
81 (1991).
184. Id. at 79.
185. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing the Shamgar exception
to the right to prior hearings in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Commander
of the Central Front).
186. See Bracha, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 77 (stating that national secu-
rity concerns alone do not create an exception to the right to prior hearings). In ex-
amining the language of Justice Shamgar's exception in Commander of the Central
Front, it is clear that he was referring to military operations, such as those during
combat circumstances. Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Commander of the
Central Front, H.C. 358/88, 43(2) Piskei Din 529 (1989), discussed in Baruch Bracha,
Judicial Review of Security Powers in Israel: A New Policy of the Courts, 28 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 39, 76 (1991). Bracha distinguishes national security concerns from mili-
tary needs in the context of the military administration over the occupied territories,
and identifies the Palestinian uprising activity that interrupts the regular maintenance
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The outcome in Commander of the Southern Front was likely due to
the Court's broad interpretation of the exception to the right to prior
hearings.8 7 In that case, the Military Commander issued a demolition
order, without a prior right of appeal, four days after the murder of an
army officer in the occupied territories.' Justice Elon focused on the
"substantial risk to human life and [the] real apprehension" created by
the delay for a prior hearing. 9 Elon found that "in such a situation,
the supreme principle of safeguarding human life is preferable to that of
a right to a hearing."'"
Yet, the Military Commander in Commander of the Southern Front
chose to wait four days before implementing the demolition order,
leaving sufficient time for the petitioners to obtain attorneys and file
appeals with the advisory committee.' Under these circumstances,
of public order as only a national security concern (but Bracha never elaborates as to
what differences exist between national security interests and military needs). Id.
187. See Bracha, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 81 (stating that the Israeli
Supreme Court did not adhere to the narrow context of the exception laid out in
Commander of the Central Front when delivering the decision in Commander of the
Southern Front).
188. Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Commander of the Southern Front,
H.C. 4112/90, 44(4) Piskei Din 626, discussed in Baruch Bracha, Judicial Review of
Security Powers in Israel: A New Policy of the Courts, 28 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 39, 78
(1991).
189. Id. at 80.
190. Id.
191. Id. Bracha notes that in Commander of the Central Front, the petitioners
argued for a 48-hour delay in the demolition order to provide sufficient time for ob-
taining an attorney and filing an appeal to the High Court. Bracha, Judicial Review,
supra note 15, at 80 n.193. Bracha further points out the words of Justice Shamgar:
[A]n order under regulation 119 ought to include a notice allowing the address-
ees of the order the possibility to choose an attorney and apply to the military
commander before the order is caried out, within a specified time, and that
subsequently, if they wish, they should be given a further period, also specified,
to apply to this Court before the order is carried out.
Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Commander of the Central Front, H.C.
358/88, 43(2) Piskei Din 529 (1989), discussed in Baruch Bracha, Judicial Review of
Security Powers in Israel: A New Policy of the Courts, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 80
n.193 (1991).
Bracha correctly asserts that "the length of the period depends on the degree of
urgency of military requirements." Bracha, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 81
n.193.
In Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence, the Court tem-
porarily granted a petition from the deportees to stay their deportation orders before
their execution. Keinon, supra note 129, at 1. The Court heard testimony from the
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even if immediate military necessity existed, the four-day delay confirms
that available time existed to suspend the demolition order and provide a
prior hearing." Since the effectiveness of a security order's deterrence
is irrelevant, 93 the Court's only option for preserving the Military
Commander's authority in this case was by expanding Justice Shamgar's
exception to the right to prior hearings.
Under either the narrow or broad reading of Justice Shamgar's excep-
tion, the facts of Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of
Defence justified its application. The Hamas terrorists were responsible
for five deaths in one week,'" and promised more.'" The govern-
ment had a right and duty to preserve security in the occupied territo-
ries. With grave risks to human life, no time existed for a delay in
action in order to provide hearings. The dangerous environment created
by the terrorist activity impeded the ability of the Israeli Defence Forces
to maintain public order, as required by the Hague Regulations, thus
necessitating the removal of precisely those barriers envisioned in Justice
Shamgar's exception.' The circumstances in Association for Civil
state and the petitioners' attorneys for ten hours, beginning at 5:00 a.m. Id. Finally,
the Court lifted the stay and issued an order nisi. l
Thus, the real controversy in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister
of Defence was not the right to prior hearings for the deportees, because they, in
effect, received one, but whether the state had an obligation to provide the hearings
in the first place. This became the central issue as a result of the petitioners' asser-
tios that the Israeli government attempted to execute the deportations in the middle
of the night when the media could not observe the activity. See iL at 4 (noting that
the government attempted to implement the deportations in secret).
192. Bracha, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 80.
193. Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Commander of the Central Front.
H.C. 358/88, 43(2) Piskei Din 529 (1989); see supra notes 179-80 and accompanying
text (explaining that deterrence is not a factor when severe and irreversible security
measures are implemented). The Military Commander in Commander of the Southern
Front was apparently aware of the distinction between deterrent measures and preven-
tive measures when he issued the demolition order in dispute in that case. See
Bracha, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 79 (quoting the Military Commander who
stated that "this was not a 'punitive-deterrent' action under regulation 119, but rather
a case of 'urgent and immediate military necessity'").
194. See supra notes 127-28 (discussing the killings that prompted the Hamas
deportations).
195. See Clyde Haberman, Two Israeli Soldiers Ambushed in Gaza, N.Y. TIEs,
Jan. 31, 1993, at A7 (describing the first success of the Hamas activists since their
deportations in attacks against Israeli security personnel, despite their isolation in the
no-man's land).
196. See Joel Himelfarb, Israel Combats Hamas Terror Network, NEAR E. REP.,
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Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence therefore warranted the military's
security measures as a means of preserving life--a goal which must
outweigh the right to prior hearings under either a narrow or broad
reading of Justice Shamgar's exception.
B. REASONABLENESS, PROPORTIONALITY, AND NECESSITY
When the Court examines substantive legal issues emanating from the
use of security measures, the Court evaluates the military authority's
discretion according to standards of reasonableness, proportionality, and
necessity.' Generally these approaches are important methods for lim-
iting the broad decision-making power given to the military under the
Defence (Emergency) Regulations, but are not traditionally used by the
Court for examining procedural aspects of the right to prior hear-
ings.'98 The distinction between substantive and procedural legal re-
quirements is important. Substantive measures such as deportation or
detention are preventive in nature, and are designed to maintain public
order and safety.' On the other hand, procedural measures, such as
Feb. 8, 1993, at 28 (reporting that since the deportation orders were executed and the
Hamas activists removed from the territories, the Israeli Defence Forces have succeed-
ed in combatting the Hamas terrorist network in the occupied territories, including the
arrest of Hamas activists and the discovery of a cache of weapons).
197. Bracha, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 83-91.
198. See, e.g., Kawasme v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 320/80, 35(2) Piskei Din
113 (1980), summarized in 11 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 344 (1981) (holding that the
right to prior hearings is absolute in all circumstances, and the remedy of restitutio in
integrum will apply when that right is violated); Association for Civil Rights in Israel
v. Commander of the Central Front, H.C. 358/88, 43(2) Piskei Din 529 (1989), dis-
cussed in Baruch Bracha, Judicial Review of Security Powers in Israel: A New Policy
of the Courts, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 75-81 (1991) (holding that the right to prior
hearings may be suspended due to operational necessity of the military, which is ap-
plied on a case-by-case basis).
199. See Weiner, Terrorism, supra note 5, at 194 (noting that the Defence (Emer-
gency) Regulations are not punitive measures, but are used only to prevent further
harm or illegal activity). Specifically, the Regulations are used only when criminal
proceedings are not available or expedient for protection of the state's interests. Id.
The government reiterated this point and stated that the deportations in the
Hamas Deportation Case were necessary to protect military personnel and prevent
further violence, but not to punish the terrorists. TEMPORARY EXCLUSION ORDERS--
LEGAL ASPECrS, supra note 13, sec. 2.
The Israeli Supreme Court explained the purpose of Regulation 110 with regard
to its application:
mhe power defined in Regulation 110 cannot be used to punish a person for
past acts or serve as a substitute for criminal proceedings. The power is pre-
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suspending the right to prior hearings, add the element of urgency, and
are therefore designed only for immediate preventive activity for the
security of military personnel and civilians. Certain aspects of the
Court's three standards of judicial review, however, are applicable to an
examination of the procedural right to prior hearings.
1. Reasonableness and the Near Certainty Test
Under the reasonableness test, the Court determines whether the mili-
tary authority gave appropriate weight to the importance of the personal
liberty at issue when issuing a security order."0 One component of this
test requires the military authority to have "near certainty" that fail-
ure to institute the security order will result in a "real and substantial
injury to state security." 3 The Court discussed the near certainty test
in Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor. In that case, the military pro-
ventative, that is to say it is directed towards the future and may only be used
in order to avert an anticipated danger. It is of course possible that the evalua-
tion of a situation with regard to the future is based on acts done in the past;
it could hardly be otherwise, for a logical conclusion drawn by the holder of
power must be based on facts, and no facts, whether they concern acts that
were brought to completion or whether they point to preparation for the com-
mission of acts endangering public safety or the defence of the state.
Baranseh v. O.C. Central Command, H.C. 242/81, 36(4) Piskei Din 249-50 (1981),
cited in Justus R. Weiner, Terrorism: Israel's Legal Responses, 14 SYR. INT'L L &
COM. 183, 194 n.56 (1987). See also Bracha, Defence Regulations, supra note 72, at
313 n.64 (discussing the preventive-punitive distinction in Al Kuri v. Chief of Staff.
H.C. 95/49, 4 Piskei Din 34A, 46).
200. See generally Defence (Emergency) Regulations, supra notes 70-84 and ac-
companying text (describing the discretion empowered in the Military Commander in
terms of public safety and state security). The right to prior hearings goes beyond
these needs, and as Justice Shamgar pointed out in his exception to the right to prior
hearings, time is of the essence for excusing this procedural right. Supra note 179
and accompanying text See also Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Commander
of the Southern Front, H.C. 4112190, 44(4) Piskei Din 626. discussed in Baruch
Bracha, Judicial Review of Security Measures in Israel: A New Policy of the Courts,
28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 80 (1991) (finding that the right to prior hearings is abso-
lute "unless the [security measure] is required straight away and without delay owing
to urgent military and security requirements").
201. Bracha, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 83.
202. Id. at 57. While Bracha uses the term "near certainty," the Court in Schnitzer
v. Chief Military Censor refers to "proximate certainty." Schnitzer v. Chief Military
Censor, H.C. 660180, 42(4) Piskei Din 617 (1988), summarized in 24 Isr. L REv.
304, 305 (1990). The difference is likely due to confusion in translation.
203. Bracha, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 57.
204. Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor, H.C. 660/80. 42(4) Piskei Din 617 (1988),
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hibited, under Defence (Emergency) Regulation 87(1), a publication that
criticized .the director of the Mossad and announced the date of his
replacement.' The Military Censor determined that such a publication
would threaten the functioning of the intelligence service.2"a The Court
struck down the Military Censor's action, and affirmed the critical im-
portance of a free press and free speech in a democratic society."
The court measured the likelihood that the publication would endanger
state security and considered the degree of injury it would cause,"ta
and found only a remote possibility of damage to state security." 9 In
another case involving free speech and communication, the Court also
applied the near certainty test, but added that the test should be applied
in light of the circumstances of time and place.210
Within the context of suspending the right to prior hearings in depor-
tation proceedings, the Court need only determine whether near certainty
exists as to continued violence and danger to human life if the deporta-
tions are not immediately executed. In Association for Civil Rights in
Israel v. Minister of Defence, the pattern of violence and murder,2 ' in
addition to the statements of the deportees that more violence and mur-
der was to follow," constituted sufficient grounds under the near cer-
tainty test to justify the Military Commanders' refusal to provide prior
summarized in 24 ISR. L. REV. 304 (1990).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 304-07. The Military Censor's rationale for disapproving the publication
at issue was that revealing functions of the Director of the intelligence service would
damage the efficiency of his work, and thus jeopardize state security. Id. at 306.
207. See id. at 306-07 (discussing the Court's assertion that the public had a right
to know about the appointment of a new director of the intelligence service, and that
given the method of judicial review employed by the Court, the censor inappropriately
prevented the publication of this important information).
208. Id. The Court determined that the appropriate question for applying the near
certainty test "is always whether the degree of damage, set off by the probability that
it will not occur, justifies the restricting of a human right to prevent that danger."
Id., quoting Neiman v. Chairman of the Central Committee for the Elections to the
11th Knesset, 39(2) Piskei Din 225 (1985).
209. Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor, H.C. 660/88, 42(4) Piskei Din 617 (1988),
summarized in 24 ISR. L. REV. 304, 306 (1990).
210. L.S.M. Law in the Service of Man v. Commander of the I.D.F. in Judea and
Samaria, H.C. 270/88, 42(3) Piskei Din 260 (1988), summarized in 24 ISR. L. REV.
310 (1990).
211. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (discussing the Hamas terrorist
attacks that killed five persons in one week).
212. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing the Hamas statement
promising more violence).
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hearings. This test is not one of absoluteness, but of circumstance, and
should not serve in a self-defeating manner. Justice Barak, in Schnitzer,
cautioned against the danger of allowing efforts to protect personal lib-
erties to overshadow national security interests because "democracy has
to exist to preserve itself."'
Justice Barak's concern that national security is necessary to protect
democracy resulted in an inconsistent application of the near certainty
test.2L 14 Nonetheless, the test provides the Court with a foundation for
an exception to the right to prior hearings in deportation proceedings in
circumstances similar to those described in Association for Civil Rights
in Israel v. Minister of Defence.
2. Proportionality and the Less Restrictive Alternative Test
The proportionality test requires that the military authority impose
security measures that bear a "direct relationship" to the expectation of
danger.2 5 A component of the direct relationship requirement is the
213. Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor, H.C. 660188, 42(4) Piskei Din 617 (1988),
discussed in Baruch Bracha, Judicial Review of Security Powers in Israel: A New
Policy of the Courts, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 57 (1991).
214. See Bracha, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 58 (noting that the Court has
not applied the near certainty test in all cases where the freedom of speech conflicts
with security considerations). The inconsistency is due to the nature of the security
measures employed and the potential risk to the state. See id. at 59 (discussing that
the Minister of the Interior need only have an "apprehension which has not been
disproven" under the Emergency (Foreign Travel) Regulations of 1948 in order to
restrict foreign travel).
215. See Atmallah v. Commander of the Northern Command. H.C. 672/87, 42(4)
Piskei Din 708, 710 (1988), summarized in 19 IsR. Y.B. Hum. RTs. 373 (1989) (de-
scribing how the proportionality test is applied to different security measures). The
Atmallah Court stated:
Restriction orders may be of different types, and they also vary in the extent
of harm they cause. An order for "house arrest" . . . is not the same as an
order which limits freedom of movement to a certain area. And an order defin-
ing a certain area to which a certain person is to be restricted has not the
same impact on a person who has been "deported" to such area. An order
prohibiting a person from travelling abroad is not the same as an order restrict-
ing such person's freedom of movement within the state . . . But any interfer-
ence with such freedom of movement of whatever degree must be the outcome
of considering the two principles, one vis-a-vis the other, and the conviction
that interference is imperative for achieving the security aim. It means that
there has to be a direct relationship between the measure adopted and the ex-
tent of danger expected from the person against whom a restriction order has
been issued.
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"less restrictive alternative" test,"6 which compels the military authori-
ty to utilize a security measure that produces the least restrictions on
personal liberties in reaching the security goal."7
The Israeli Supreme Court applied the less restrictive alternative test
in Tamimi v. Minister of Defence."8 In that case, the Military Com-
mander issued an order that limited the right of attorneys in the Judea
and Samaria region to join a bar council. 9 The Court found that the
Military Commander's concern over the hostile elements participating in
the council did not warrant the destruction of the organization's indepen-
dence.' The Court determined that other alternatives were available to
the Military Commander."M
The less restrictive alternative test is well suited for the Court in
evaluating the military authority's power to suspend the right to prior
hearings in deportation proceedings. As in Association for Civil Rights
in Israel v. Minister of Defence, the only choices available to the mili-
tary powers, according to the Court, are detention or immediate deporta-
tion.' If an immediate deportation without a prior hearing is not ap-
Atmallah v. Commander of the Northern Command, H.C. 672/87, 42(4) Piskei Din
708 (1988), discussed in Baruch Bracha, Judicial Review of Security Powers in Israel:
A New Policy of the Courts, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 85 (1991).
See Levadi v. Commander of the I.D.F. in the West Bank, H.C. 672/88, 43(2)
Piskei Din 227 (1989), discussed in Baruch Bracha, Judicial Review of Security Pow-
ers in Israel: A New Policy of the Courts, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 86 n.228 (1991)
(using the proportionality test to overturn a deportation order where less severe mea-
sures were available against the deportee).
216. See Bracha, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 85 (noting that an authority
should not use a severe measure if the state objective can be met through a less
restrictive alternative).
217. See The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARv. L. REV.
1130, 1297 (1972) (discussing the use of the less restrictive alternative test in the
context of American judicial review).
218. Tamimi v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 507/85, 41(4) Piskei Din 57 (1986),
summarized in 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 248 (1988).
219. Id. at 249. Order No. 1164 allowed the Military Commander to appoint offi-
cers to the Bar Council (rather than permit elections), set membership dues, manage
the finances, and set the schedule and agenda for meetings. Id.
220. Id. at 251.
221. Id. The Court, however, did not indicate what alternatives existed for the
Military Commander, or what analysis should be implemented to determine the most
appropriate security measure. Id.
222. See TEMPORARY EXCLUSION ORDERS--LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 13 (noting
that the Israeli Supreme Court has held that where imprisonment does not satisfy the
security needs of the state, deportation is a lawful alternative). In addition, as in As-
434 [VOL. 10: 1
1994] THE HAMAS DEPORTATION 435
propriate, then by default, detention2 is required until a deportation
hearing and appeal is provided, which could take as long as one
year. Thus, the Court must consider the cost, effectiveness, and re-
strictiveness of detention as compared to immediate deportationm'
Although concern exists about the judicial branch's ability to evaluate
the cost, effectiveness, and restrictiveness of alternative security mea-
sures during a state emergency m the less restrictive alternative test is
within the court's capabilities.' For example, the circumstances in As-
sociation for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence, prison camps are often
used as bases for terrorist activity and do not preserve the security necessary for pub-
lic order. Id.
See Zeer Segal, Justices Speak Loudly on Right to be Heard, THE JERUSALM
POST, Jan. 29, 1993, at 4 (noting that proportionality has traditionally served as an
important factor in determining whether deportations are appropriate measures against
suspected terrorists where detentions have been ineffective). See generally Rodan. su-
pra note 130, at 4 (discussing whether Israeli authorities can deport Palestinians with-
out their appeals being heard by the Court). In considering the appropriate proportion-
ality of security measures, the Israeli government stated that capital punishment is not
an option it is willing to consider, even in the fight against terrorism. TiPORARY
EXCLUSION ORDERS-LEGAL AsPEcrs, supra note 13, sec. 2.
Justus Weiner, the former director of the Human Rights Division of the Israeli
Justice Department, noted that "[w]hen weighed against Israel's legal options in at-
tempting to obstruct the designs of hardened terrorists, namely, the activation of the
death penalty or very long terms of solitary confinement in prison, deportation is
arguably the most humane measure available." Justus Reid Weiner, Human Rights in
the Israeli Administered Areas During the Intifada: 1987-1990, 10 Wisc. INT'L L.J.
185, 211 (1992).
223. U.N. Chief Meets on Exiles, N.Y. TImEs, Dec. 31, 1992, at A3 (stating that
U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali insists that Israel should place the deportees in
internment camps and prosecute them for violations of Israeli law rather than deport
them). See also Ehud Yaari, A Safe Haven for Hamas in America, N.Y. TINES, Jan.
27, 1993, at A23 (stating that the Hamas terrorists should have been kept in detention
centers rather than deported because now the Israeli government faces the politically-
more difficult task of returning them).
224. See Rodan, supra note 130, at 4 (noting that such a long period of time can
eliminate the effectiveness of the deportation order).
225. See The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, supra note 217, at
1298 (describing the three factors courts must consider in evaluating the national
security-personal liberty balance as including the relative costs, effectiveness, and
restrictiveness of the security measures).
226. Id. at 1299. The judicial branch is often not capable of evaluating security
measures because it lacks the expertise for determining the appropriateness of actions
under such emergency situations. Id.
227. See id, (providing, as an example, the courts' ability to evaluate the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution during both
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sociation for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence clearly dem-
onstrate that keeping the deportees in detention centers created the po-
tential for widespread unrest within the centers, prisons, and in the
streets of the occupied territories." Thus, detention would jeopardize
the goal of maintaining security and preserving order and would there-
fore be less effective than immediate deportation. Yet, since the burden
of persuasion is on the petitioner attacking the government's action,
2 9
an alternative measure requires substantially similar effectiveness in
restoring order for the Court to strike down the military authority's mea-
sure.
230
As a result, adoption of the less restrictive alternative test provides
the Court with a means for evaluating exceptions to the right to prior
hearings in deportation proceedings and maintaining its interventionist
trend in examining military discretion. At the same time, the Court
preserves the ability of the military to effectively contain hostile activity
in the occupied territories because the burden to offer a more effective
alternative lies with the petitioner, not with the government."
3. Military Necessity for Security Measures
The Court has struggled to establish the appropriate standard of judi-
cial review in evaluating military necessity for security measures im-
posed by the Military Commander. Expertise in evaluating the emergen-
cy circumstances in the occupied territories, and the need for remedial
action, rests with the military and not the Court. The military necessity
approach has resulted only in examinations of the military authority's
normal and emergency times).
228. See TEMPORARY ExcLuSION ORDERS--LEGAL AsPECTs, supra note 13, sec. 4
(stating that detainees often use their prisons as bases for organizing violent acts).
229. The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, supra note 217, at 1300.
230. Id. The Court however would not be required to make "subtle comparative
evaluations" in determining whether alternative measures are more appropriate. Id.
Rather, by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court needs to decide whether the
alternative "would be substantially as effective." Id.
231. See contra Ahmard H. Tabari, Humanitarian Law: Deportation of Palestinians
From the West Bank and Gaza, 29 HARv. INT'L L.J. 552, 557 (1988) (disputing the
presumption that deportations will necessarily provide more security in the occupied
territories than detentions). Instead, the deportations will only increase rioting in the
territories, in which case the Israeli military will have to resort to mass deportations
(which violate Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention) in order to establish
calm. Id.
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motives in creating security measures, an approach the Court has yet to
adopt consistently. 2
Commentators note that the Court's interventionist trend began in the
late 1970's with its decision in Dweikat v. Government of Israel (known
as the Elon Moreh case),m3 In that decision, the Court, for the first
time, examined military necessity for an order to expropriate land by the
Military Commander in the West Bank.'m  The Court concluded that
the Military Commander acted out of political motives rather than mili-
tary necessity, 5  and overturned the security order. 6  The Elon
Moreh decision represented a landmark for the Court,'m leading the
Court to consider more than jurisdictional or procedural disputes, but
substantive rightsm s
Whether the Military Commanders in Association for Civil Rights in
Israel v. Minister of Defence were faced with a military necessity that
required immediate expulsion without a prior hearing, requires an evalu-
ation of the decision-making process that led to the deportationm 9 Al-
though dispute exists about whether military necessity within an area un-
der military administration is ever valid,2' necessity pursuant to "su-
232. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's deci-
sion in Alyubi and its refusal to examine military necessity).
233. Dweikat v. Gov't of Israel, H.C. 390179, 34(1) Piskei Din 1 (1979). summa-




237. See Shimon Shetreet, Developments in Constitutional Law: Selected Topics, 24
ISR. L. REv. 368, 417-18 (1991) (stating that the Elon Aforeh decision was the "sa-
lient turning point" for the Court in establishing an interventionist approach to its
cases).
238. Id. at 417.
239. G. VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPAT1ON OF ENEMY TERRrroRY 226-27 (1957),
discussed in Esther Rosalind Cohen, Justice for Occupied Territory? The Israeli High
Court of Justice Paradigm, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471, 504 n.120 (1986).
240. Id. at 504. von Glahn states:
It must be remembered that practically all measures of real importance under-
taken by an occupant in hostile territory fall in a period of time when the
military phase of active hostilities has passed from the occupied territory and
when the occupant attempts to establish an orderly administration. Hence, there
is an absence of nationally vital necessity and a lack of real necessity which
would enable a successful employment of the defence in question.
Id.
Justice Witkin, in his opinion in the Beit El case, disagreed with von Glahn's
analysis and stated that no distinction between military necessity and security necessity
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pervised regulation or administration would normally be upheld...
,,241 Thus, in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of De-
fence, the examination of military necessity by the Israeli cabinet, the
Ministerial Committee for National Security Matters, and the Military
Commanders in the occupied territories u 2 demonstrates the close analy-
sis and consideration of the security needs under the circumstances in
that case. As a result, the military necessity examination of security
measures provides the Court with reasonable assurance that the govern-
ment carefully considered and weighed the relevant factors in reaching a
decision.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Following the Court's decision in Association for Civil Rights in
Israel v. Minister of Defence, the Israeli government and the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) began secret talks to negotiate a mutual
recognition agreement 3 that eventually led to the signing of the Dec-
laration of Principles in Washington, D.C. 24 Whether such talks were
exists. But see Sulkman Tufik Ayub v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 606/78, 33(2)
Piskei Din 113 (1978), summarized in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 337 (1979), where
Justice Witkin concluded:
In our opinion, this distinction is irrelevant. As I have just mentioned, the
existing situation [in the occupied territories] is one of belligerency, and the
occupying power has the responsibility [to] maintain order and security in the
occupied territory. It must meet those dangers arising within the occupied area
threatening the occupied area and the occupying state itself. Combat presently
takes the form of sabotage, and even those who would regard such actions
(which harm innocent civilians) as guerrilla warfare, would admit that the occu-
pying power is authorized and is obliged to take any measures to prevent them.
The military and the security aspect are one in the same.
Id.
241. Id. at 504 n.120.
242. See supra note 129 (explaining the decision-making process which led to the
implementation of the deportations of the Hamas terrorists).
243. See Letter from Yasir Arafat to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (Sept. 9, 1993)
(available at the Embassy of Israel, Washington, D.C.) (stating that the PLO recogniz-
es the right of the State of Israel to exist); Letter from Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
to Yasir Arafat (Sept. 9, 1993) (available at the Embassy of Israel, Washington, D.C.)
(stating that the State of Israel recognizes the PLO as the representative of the Pal-
estinian people).
244. See supra note 1 (discussing the signing of the Declaration of Principles
between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization on September 13, 1993 in




prompted by the Court's decision remains unknown. The decision, how-
ever, underscored the Court's unwillingness to jeopardize Israel's negoti-
ating position in the peace process or Israeli national security when it
denied the Hamas activists the protection of the Court.
To the contrary, the Court reassured the Israeli military of its broad
powers through the Defence (Emergency) Regulations designed to coun-
ter terrorist activity.As Thus, the Court encouraged the Palestinians to
utilize the peace process, rather than terrorism, as a means of achieving
self-rule and potential independence in the occupied territories.'
Until the Court applies limits to the military's powers in deportation
proceedings neither the military nor the Palestinians will know the crite-
ria which permit immediate deportations without the right to prior hear-
ings. The Declaration of Principles and the self-rule accord are not the
end of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but are merely the beginning of serious
and substantial peace talks.247 Neither the Declaration of Principles nor
245. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (emphasizing the undisputed authori-
ty of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations).
246. See Lisa Beyer, Victims or Victors?, TIME, Jan. 11, 1993, at 23 (stating that
Israeli officials believe the key to a successful and peaceful resolution with the Pales-
tinians "lies in defusing Hamas' power"). A struggle exists between the PLO and
Hamas for control over the Palestinian agenda in the peace process. Id. at 22. While
the PLO is committed to the peace process with Israel in hopes of reaching a com-
promise on self-rule and independence, Hamas seeks the complete destruction of the
Jewish state through terrorism and violence and the liberation of all of pre-1948 Pal-
estine. Id.
Thus, Israel's goal is to reward the PLO for negotiating for peace and to pun-
ish Hamas for utilizing terrorism. Id. Israel must provide the PLO with the tangential
evidence of its success in negotiating with Israel in the peace process for fear that
otherwise the Palestinians will turn to Hamas and terrorism as a means for achieving
their goals. See Joseph Nevo, The Hamas-PLO Battle for Palestinian Support, NEAR
E. REP., Feb. 15, 1993, at 4 (discussing the PLO's efforts to become the "sole repre-
sentative of the Palestinian people"). The deportation of the Hamas activists provided
the following benefits to the PLO: "(1) the weakening of Hamas would reduce its
threat to PLO hegemony in the territories; (2) this would provide the PLO with the
opportunity to make itself spokesman for all Palestinians, regardless of their religious
or political convictions" d.
The Hamas threat to the peace process and the PLO is a central concern to
Yasir Arafat who allegedly asked "[w]hen will Israel do something about these Hamas
fundamentalists?" Richard Z. Chesnoff, Fundamentalist Fears, U.S. NEvs & WORLD
REP., Jan. 11, 1993, at 29. Other Palestinians note the trouble with Hamas' terrorist
approach: 'They want us to boycott the peace process, but they are not offering any
realistic alternative." Id.
247. See President Bill Clinton, Address at the Signing of the Declaration of Prin-
ciples (Sept. 13, 1993) (stating that the Declaration "charts a course toward reconcilia-
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the self-rule accord between Israel and the PLO alters the jurisdiction of
the Court in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank,' the continued pres-
ence of the Israeli military in the territories,2 49 nor the acts of violence
by Palestinian extremists that might warrant emergency measures by
Military Commanders.' In order to prevent further controversies simi-
lar to the deportation of the Hamas terrorists the Court must provide
appropriate guidance to the military in its approach to future confronta-
tions with the Palestinian population.
This Note offers two recommendations to the Israeli Supreme Court
for addressing Israeli deportation proceedings, and other emergency
measures employed by the Israeli military, during the continuing military
presence in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
tion" and that "difficult work ...lies ahead"); Goshko and Murphy, supra note 2, at
Al (quoting Prime Minister Rabin as saying that "[w]e have witnessed, you have
witnessed, the world has witnessed, the tip of the iceberg of problems we shall have
to overcome in the implementation" of the self-rule accord).
248. See supra note 4 (discussing the unclear jurisdiction of the Israeli Supreme
Court in light of the combined effects of the Declaration of Principles and the Gaza-
Jericho self-rule accord). As a result of the self-rule accord, the Palestinians are
charged with providing internal security to the territories while the Israelis are respon-
sible for protecting the territories against external threats. Id.
249. See Declaration of Principles, supra note 1, arts. V, VIII, XIII, XIV (discuss-
ing the continued presence of the Israeli military for overall security in the occupied
territories); see also Goshko and Murphy, supra note 2, at A40 (outlining the jurisdic-
tion of the Israeli security forces in the occupied territories).
250. See, e.g., Rampage Over West Bank Death, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1993, at
117 (reporting disturbances in the West Bank following a Hamas attack that killed a
Jewish settler); Clyde Haberman, PLO Moderate Short Dead, Raising Fears on Pact,
N.Y. TIMES. Oct. 22, 1993, at A3 (discussing the killing of the third senior Palestin-
ian leader in less than a month as part of an apparent power struggle for control of
the PLO after the occupied territories are transferred from Israel to the Palestinians);
Joel Greenberg, Palestinians Slay 2 Israeli Hikers; Israelis Kill Suspected Guerrilla,
N.Y. TIMES, at Ill, Oct. 10, 1993 (describing the brutal attack on the civilian hikers);
Clyde Haberman, 30 Israelis Hurt by Suicide Bomber, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1993, at
A7 (describing the fourth suicide attack since the signing of the Declaration of Princi-
ples by Hamas in order to disrupt the peace process); Israeli Fatally Stabbed; Arab
Group Suspected, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1993, at 13 (reporting on one of a series of
Hamas attacks in opposition of the peace process); Arafat Ally Slain After Gaza Rally,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1993, at A16 (describing the mounting tensions within the
Fatah faction of the PLO on the issue of self-rule).
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A. APPLY THE LEss RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE T
First, the Court should apply a single, uniform standard of judicial
review in examining emergency decisions by the military. The less re-
strictive alternative test' discussed by the Court in Tamimi v. Minister
of Defence, should replace the current standard of review. This ap-
proach allows the Court to consider whether the actions of the Military
Commander produced the least restrictions on the personal liberties of
the accused in reaching the security goal."53 Thus, the Court must de-
termine the most effective method of achieving the security goal by
examining both the options of the Military Commander on the one hand,
and the relative threat of the accused to national security on the other
hand2z' This combination of factors permits the Court to weigh the
needs of the military in preserving national security while assuring mini-
mal injury to the rights of the accused under international law.
Two other methods of judicial review discussed above, the near cer-
tainty test?" and the military necessity test' 6 focus exclusively on
either the acts of the accused or the acts of the military leaders in deter-
mining whether to uphold the Military Commander's security order.'
251. See supra notes 216-31 and accompanying text (discussing the less restrictive
alternative test).
252. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text (discussing Tamimi v. Minis-
ter of Defence, H.C. 507/85, 41(4) Piskei Din 57 (1986), summarized in 18 ISR. Y.B.
HuM. RTs. 248 (1988)).
253. See supra note 217 (defining the application of the less restrictive alternative
test).
254. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text (discussing the Tamimi
Court's examination of both the security measure employed by the Military Com-
mander and the relative hostile threat created by the bar council in determining to
strike down the security measure under the less restrictive alternative test).
255. See supra notes 202-14 and accompanying text (discussing the near certainty
test).
256. See supra notes 232-42 and accompanying text (discussing the military neces-
sity review by the Court).
257. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (discussing the Schnitzer
Court's examination of the importance of free speech and a free press in a democrat-
ic society without any review of the security measure employed by the Military Cen-
sor); see also supra notes 233-37, 241-42 (discussing the Eton Moreh Court's exami-
nation of political motives of the Military Commander in striking down the security
order under the military necessity test, and von Glahi's requirement of supervised
regulation under that test, both which ignore any consideration of the acts of the
accused).
1994] 441
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Unlike the less restrictive alternative test, neither of these tests balanc-
es 8 the military and human rights interests nor consider the appro-
priateness of the security order, and thus does not allow the Court to
consider whether other means existed for the military to limit the impact
on the rights of the accused. As a result, the less restrictive alternative
test is an important tool for securing human rights protection for the
Palestinians, the original purpose behind granting jurisdiction to the
Court over the territories in 1967,"s while maintaining necessary con-
sideration for security goals for the military and the government.
The exception to the right to prior hearings discussed in Association
for Civil Rights in Israel v. Commander of the Central Front'W also
serves as an important method for creating bounds to an immediate
deportation order.2 ' Given the specific language used by then-Justice
Shamgar in that exception, however,2 62 its general applicability to the
different security measures under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations
is not clear. In addition, the exception only applies to immediate actions
by the Military Commander where the right to prior hearings requires
suspension. Thus the goal of a uniform approach by the Court is lost
under this exception. Uniformity is important as a means of assuring the
Court's consistency in addressing human rights concerns under interna-
tional law. This consistency may prevent the appearance of arbitrariness
258. But see Bracha, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 101 (stating that interven-
tionism by the Court is most effective by escaping the use of balance tests which
provide too weak a protection for human rights interests). Bracha asserts that the most
effective test for an interventionist Court is the near certainty formula, which he iden-
tifies as particularly appropriate in the cases of detention and restraining orders. Id.
259. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing Attorney General
Shamgar's rationale for creating Israeli Supreme Court jurisdiction over military orders
in the occupied territories). Shamgar was greatly concerned that without the Supreme
Court's review of military decisions in the occupied territories, such security orders
would appear arbitrary and only exasperate the tension and bitterness felt by the Pal-
estinians. Cohen, High Court of Justice, supra note 4, at 473.
260. See supra notes 174-96 and accompanying text (discussing the Shamngar ex-
ception to the right to prior hearings addressed in Association for Civil Rights in
Israel v. Commander of the Central Front, H.C. 358/88, 43(2) Piskei Din 529 (1989),
discussed in Baruch Bracha, Judicial Review of Security Powers in Israel: A New
Policy of the Courts, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 75-81 (1991)).
261. See Bracha, Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 101 (stating that the courts
should strictly adhere to the exception laid down in Association for Civil Rights in
Israel v. Commander of the Central Front and only allow the military to escape their
requirement of prior hearings when "urgent and immediate military necessity" exists).
262. Supra note 179 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 10: 1
THE HAMAS DEPORTATION
in the Court's decisions, and maintain the Court's record as an inde-
pendent, non-political body in a thriving democratic state.2'
B. ELIMINATE THE REMEDY OF RFSTITUTIO IN INTEGRUM
The Note's second recommendation is that the Court eliminate the
remedy of restitutio in integrum' in cases involving immediate de-
portations without the right to prior hearings. The remedy, discussed in
Kawasme v. Minister of Defence' and applied by the Court in Associ-
ation for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence,' is designed to
assure that deportees maintain the right to appeal their deportation orders
if they are not provided with that option in the first instance by the
Military Commander.' Rather than serve as a remedy to deportees,
however, restitutio in integrum is an escape hatch for the Court, allow-
ing the Justices to find that the military violated the deportee's rights by
not providing a prior hearing, but not holding the deportation order null
and void.' Instead, the Court upholds the deportation order and per-
mits the deportee to appeal the deportation order from exile or from a
place determined by the advisory committee.' The advantage of this
remedy to the Court is that the deportee remains expelled from the
occupied territories to the benefit of the government, while securing the
right to appeal the deportation order for the deportee.
Ultimately, this remedy allows the Court to avoid the issue of the
legality of immediate deportations without prior hearings under interna-
263. See Paula E. Marcus, The Treatment of Terrorists in the Israeli Occupied
Territories, 3 AM. U. . INT'L L. & POL'Y 451, 471-77 (1988) (discussing the ap-
pearance of arbitrariness and disproportionality in the Court's treatment of Palestin-
ians).
264. See Shetreet, supra note 237, at 405-10 (discussing the status and role of the
Israeli judicial system in light of the failures of the political branches).
265. See supra notes 110, 149 (discussing the application of the restinitio in integ-
rum remedy for deportees in Kawasme v. Minister of Defence and Association for
Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence, respectively).
266. Supra note 110.
267. Supra note 149.
268. See supra note 110 (discussing the use of the restitutlo in integnim remedy).
269. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing the Kaw.asme Court's
decision to provide the remedy of restitutio in integrum without nullifying the depor-
tation orders).
270. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (explaining that the deportees
were granted the right to appeal their deportation orders at a time and place deter-
mined by the advisory committee).
1994] 443
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
tional law because the deportee is always assured of the right to appeal
the order at some later point in time. The fundamental problem with this
remedy is that no incentive exists for the Military Commander to make
a careful determination of the national security interests and the relative
threats of the accused. Under the Court's approach, the Military Com-
mander always knows that the deportation order, whether it provides for
the right to prior hearings or not, will survive judicial scrutiny. One way
or another, the Military Commander will successfully expel the deportee,
and the deportee will successfully receive a right to appeal, although the
appeal may occur after the deportation is implemented.
Such a remedy is contrary to the goals of an interventionist Court,
one that actively seeks to protect human rights while balancing the
needs of the military and the government. By eliminating the remedy of
restitutio in integrum, the Court will create the necessary incentives for
the Military Commander to avoid arbitrary and capricious decisions. If
the Military Commander falls to provide a prior hearing, and is not
justified in depriving the deportee of that right under an immediate
review of that right by the High Court of Justice, the deportee would
then be returned to the territories and the deportation order nullified.
The deportee therefore would not need to appeal the deportation order
itself. In addition, the Court will properly determine the limits of the
military's actions and the extent of the deportee's rights under interna-
tional law during immediate deportations without the right to prior hear-
ings.
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Min-
ister of Defence represents a major break from the interventionist ap-
proach that the Court had adopted in the late 1970's. Whether this deci-
sion is merely a temporary reversal or a new trend is difficult to deter-
mineY The circumstances surrounding the deportation of the Hamas
271. See Shetreet, supra note 237, at 424 (discussing the decline in importance of
security factors by the Court). The trend of the Court will likely be determined by
the outcome of the peace process. If Shetreet is correct in asserting that the signifi-
cance of security considerations is diminishing (which would likely continue to occur
as peace develops in the Middle East), then the Court will eventually provide less
weight to such security factors in its decisions. This would indicate that the decision
in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence was merely a tempo-
rary reversal of its interventionist trend.
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terrorists were unusual and, given the signing of the Declaration of Prin-
ciples and the self-rule accord, possibly the last such decision the Court
will ever face.m The Court's decision, however, demonstrates the dif-
ficult and frustrating task the judicial branch has in balancing national
security interests with humanitarian rights in a democracy surrounded by
hostile elements.' With such obstacles, however, the Israeli Supreme
Court has served its role honorably in preserving the important security
powers of the military during national crises, while also providing nec-
essary judicial review to protect personal liberties that inappropriately
suffer during such emergencies.
To support the theory that the decision in Association for Civil Rights in Israel
v. Minister of Defence was an anomaly in the Court's interventionist trend, note that,
only two weeks after that decision, the High Court of Justice ruled that the army
could not conduct the demolition of homes of convicted Palestinian terrorists if such
action would affect others. Turkemaan v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 5510/92, reported
in Asher Felix Landau, When A Home May Not Be Demolished. TM JERUSALM
POST, Feb. 22, 1993, available in Lexis, Nexis Library, Jerusalem Post file.
272. But see supra note 4 (stating that the jurisdiction of the Court is not clear
after the signing of the Declaration of Principles). Although, politically, large-scale
deportations will not occur again due to the self-rule accord, Israel has managed to
deport four PLO terrorists from the Gaza strip since the self-rule accord was execut-
ed. PLO Expulsion, id., at 44A.
273. See, e.g., Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor, H.C. 680/88, 42(4) Piskei Din
617, 645 (1988), discussed in Baruch Bracha, Judicial Review of Security Powers in
Israel: A New Policy of the Courts, 28 STA. J. Imr'L L 39. 99 (1991) (stating that
any democracy's security exists in its moral character, as well as its military defense).
Justice Barak stated:
Of course, democracy is entitled, and obliged, to protect itself. Without security
a democratic state would not exist. However, it must not be forgotten that
security is more than a matter of armed forces. Democracy too is security. Our
strength consists in our moral power and in our adherence to the principles of
democracy, especially when we are encompassed by such dangers. Indeed, secu-
rity is not an end in itself, but a means. The end is democratic government.
i.e., a government of the people, which guarantees individual freedoms.
